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CORPORATE AMERICA FIGHTS BACK THE
BATTLE OVER WAIVER OF THE ATTORNEY-
CLIENT PRIVILEGE
MICHAEL L. SEIGEL*
Abstract: This Article addresses a topic that is the subject of an on-going
and heated contest between the business lobby and its lawyers, on the one
side, and the U.S. Department of Justice on the other. The fight is over
federal prosecutors' escalating practice of requesting that corporations
accused of criminal wrongdoing waive their attorney-client privilege as
part of their cooperation with the government. The Department of Jus-
tice views privilege waiver as a legitimate and critical tool in its post-Enron
battle against white collar crime. The business lobby views it as encroach-
ing on corporations' fundamental right to protect confidential attorney-
client communications. This Article seeks to transcend the feverish rheto-
ric dominating the debate by undertaking a careful cost-benefit approach
to the matter. It concludes that the Department ofJustice's recent policy
statement on privilege waiver, contained in Deputy Attorney General Paul
McNulty's 2006 Memorandum, merits a chance to work-with a number
of important caveats that are fleshed out in the text.
INTRODUCTION
In the years leading up to the turn of the twenty-first century, the
stock market was riding high.' Everyone was making money. Some
even theorized that, because of the impact of information technology
on the U.S. economy, the market might never decline again. 2 Pre-
* Professor of Law, University of Florida Fredric G. Levin College of Law. The author
thanks Joan Heminway, Jerold Israel, Sung Hui Kim, Laird Kirkpatrick, Liesa Richter, and
Christopher Slobogin for their comments on earlier drafts. He also expresses his immense
gratitude to Tiffany Cummins for her superb research assistance.
I For example, from 1996 to 2000, the NASDAQ composite index rose from 600 to
5000. See Stock Market Crash, The Nasdaq Bubble, http://www.stock-market-crash.net/
nasdaq.htm (last visited Oct. 8, 2007).
2Id. ("Several economists even postulated that we were in a 'New Economy' where in-
flation was virtually nonexistent and the stock market crashes were obsoletel"); see alsoJeff
Madrick, Enron, the Media and the New Economy, NATION, Apr. 1, 2002, at 17 (commenting
on the rhetoric of the "new economy" of the mid-1990s that fueled the inflated speculative
value of information technology stocks); Steven Weber, The End of the Business Cycle, FOR-
EIGN AFFAIRS,July/Aug. 1997, at 69-70.
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dictably, such talk was hogwash. The soaring equity markets were the
result of "irrational exuberance,"3 and in 2000, the so-called technol-
ogy bubble burst.4 Although the result was a far cry from the Great
Depression of the 1930s, many people lost a great deal of money. In-
dividuals and institutional investors started to look for others to
blame. They quickly identified culprits: corporate officers who had
used "creative accounting" -that is, fraud-to pump up the value of
their companies in the face of declining demand for their products.5
Soon, other illegal activity came to light, including the actions of cor-
porate officers and employees who simply gave in to the greed of the
times and padded their pockets with unauthorized corporate assets. 6
The poster child for participation in this illegal activity was, of
course, the energy giant Enron. The revelation of widespread fraud at
Enron forced the company into bankruptcy and led to the loss of jobs
and pensions for thousands of its employees. 7 Consequently, Congress
and the public called for vigorous criminal pursuit, not just of Enron,
3 The term "irrational exuberance" derives from a speech entitled "The Challenge of
Central Banking in a Democracy" given by Alan Greenspan, chairman of the Federal Re-
serve Board, before the American Enterprise Institute at the Washington Hilton Hotel on
December 5, 1996. See Robert J. Schiller, Definition of Irrational Exuberance, http://
www.irrationalexuberance.com/defiition.htm (last visited Oct. 8, 2007).
4 See Leslie Eaton & Jayson Blair, Dot-Corn Fever Followed by Bout of Dot-Com Chill, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 27, 2000, at BI; Richard W. Stevenson, Economists Make It Official: U.S. Is in
Recession, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 2001, at C1 (noting that the National Bureau of Economic
Research concluded that the U.S. economy entered a recession in March of 2001).
Some of the more high-profile tech-bubble prosecutions of this type were brought
against Kenneth Lay and Jeffrey Skilling in connection with the Enron debacle. See generally
ENRON: CORPORAiE FIASCOS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS (Nancy P. Rapoport & Bala G. Dha-
ran eds., 2004) [hereinafter ENRON]; see also Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, SEC
Charges Qwest Communications International Inc. with Multi-Faceted Accounting and
Financial Reporting Fraud (Oct. 21, 2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/
2004-148.htm (announcing charges against Qwest Communications); Press Release, Sec. &
Exch. Comm'n, SEC Charges HealthSouth Corp. CEO Richard Scrushy with $1.4 Billion
Accounting Fraud (Mar. 19, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2003-34.htm
(announcing the indictment of Richard Scrushy of HealthSouth).
6 Prosecutions of this kind targeted individuals such as: Frank Bergonzi, Franklin
Brown, and Martin Grass of Rite Aid, see Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, SEC An-
nounces Fraud Charges Against Former Rite Aid Senior Management (June 21, 2002),
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2002-92.htm; James R. Brown, Michael C.
Mulcahey, James P. Rigas, John Rigas, Michael J. Rigas, and Timothy J. Rigas of Adelphia,
see Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, SEC Charges Adelphia and Rigas Family with
Massive Financial Fraud (July 24, 2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2002-
110.htmn and Mark A. Belnick, Dennis Kozlowski, and Mark H. Swartz of Tyco, see Press
Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, SEC Sues Former Tyco CEO Kozlowski, Two Others for
Fraud (Sept. 12, 2002), available at http://wwwsec.gov/news/press/2002-135.htm.
7 See Steven Harmon Wilson, Malefactors of Great Wealth: A Short History of "Aggressive Ac-
counting," in ENRON, supra note 5, at 41.
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but of all companies that had engaged in similar behavior.8 To this end,
Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in June 2002, tightening up on
corporate criminal enforcement.9 The U.S. Department of Justice
("DOJ" or the "Department") set tip an Enron Task Force to investigate
and prosecute that particular case, 10 and President George W. Bush
ordered the creation of a Corporate Fraud Task Force to build cases
against other potentially criminal corporate executives.1 At the same
time, U.S. Attorney's offices around the country stepped up their white
collar criminal enforcement.
The federal government's efforts to ferret out and prosecute cor-
porate criminals were remarkably successful. Over the four-year period
from 2002 to 2006, federal prosecutors brought charges against more
than 200 chief executive officers, company presidents, and chief finan-
cial officers, and obtained over 1100 convictions or guilty pleas in white
collar cases. 12 These are staggering figures, particularly in light of the
tremendous resources traditionally needed to investigate and prosecute
complex fraud. DOJ's newfound success in this area, however, was not
accidental. Rather, the Department had found a new and extremely
powerful investigative tool: convincing corporations to cooperate by
turning against their (often former) officers and employees.1 3
Prior to 1998, DOJ had no set policy regarding the prosecution of
corporations, and many prosecutors did not see the point of charging
an entity that, as a mere legal fiction, could not be put in jail.14 A
8 See Sarah Helene Duggin, Internal Corporate Investigations: Legal Ethics, Professionalism
and theEmployee Interview, 2003 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 859, 878 ("[T] he current enforcement
climate: legislators, law enforcement authorities, and the public are united in demanding
greater corporate accountability.... ").
9 Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C. (2000 & Supp. In 2003)).
10 See CarrieJohnson, Task Force Found Way to Top of Enron, WASH. PosT,July 10, 2004, at
El (discussing creation of the Enron Task Force in 2001).
" See United States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 337 (S.D.N.Y 2006) ("[in July 9,
2002, the President issued Executive Order 13271, which established a Corporate Fraud
Task Force....").
12 Paul Davies & Kara Scannell, Guilty Verdicts Provide "Red Meat" to Prosecutors Chasing
Companies, WALL ST. J., May 26, 2006, at Al; Jason McLure, Specter Bill Seeks to AlterDOJ Cor-
porate Fraud Investigations, LEGAL TIMEs, Dec. 8, 2006, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/
article.jsp?id=l 165501515476.
13 See Michael A. Simons, Vicarious Snitching: Crime, Cooperation, and "Good Corporate Citi-
zenship," 76 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 979, 996-97 (2007) (describing how prosecutors now take
an aggressive approach toward corporate cooperation).
14 See Duggin, supra note 8, at 868-70 (stating that, prior to the 1960s, criminal prose-
cution of corporations and other entities was very unusual); Simons, supra note 13, at 992
(noting that DOJ's 1980 Principles of Federal Prosecution said nothing about the charging
of corporations, a void that was not filled until 1999).
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memorandum written by then-Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder in
1998, however, changed all this.15 For the first time in its history, the
Department set out a list of criteria to guide prosecutors faced with de-
ciding whether to indict a corporate (or other collective) entity.16
Among other factors, the memorandum mentioned the importance of
a corporation's cooperation with the investigation. 17 It further noted
that such cooperation might require the corporation to waive its attor-
ney-client privilege and work-product protection. 18 The guidelines set
forth in the Holder Memorandum were later reinforced in a memo-
randum written by Holder's successor, then-Deputy Attorney General
Larry Thompson, in 2003.19 It did not take long before companies
threatened with prosecution understood that the only realistic way of
avoiding indictment was to cooperate fully.
It was the increase in cooperation by corporations faced with the
danger of being indicted that enabled DOJ lawyers to wrap up so many
cases in record time.20 Typically, upon learning that criminal behavior
might be taking place in its midst, a corporation conducts an internal
investigation so that it can take appropriate action. 21 Usually conducted
by counsel, either outside or in-house, the investigation leads to a re-
port supported by witness statements, internal documents, and other
evidentiary material.22 Later, upon deciding to cooperate, the corpora-
tion turns this material over to government investigators, enabling
them to uncover the facts of the case far more quickly than they would
using traditional methods of investigation. 23 As a result, prosecutors are
able to bring prompt charges against those criminally responsible and
then move. on to the next case.24
15 Memorandum from Eric Holder, Jr., Deputy Attorney Gen., to All Component
Heads and United States Attorneys (June 16, 1999) [hereinafter Holder Memorandum],
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/fraud/docs/reports/1999/chargingcorps.html
(including attachment entitled "Federal Prosecution of Corporations").
16 See generally Jason McClure, Unlikely Alliance, 53 MIAMI DAILY Bus. REv. (Dec. 20,
2006) (on file with author).
17 Holder Memorandum, supra note 15.
18 Id.
19 Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Attorney Gen., to Heads of De-
partment Components and U.S. Attorneys (Jan. 20, 2003) [hereinafter Thompson Memo-
randum], available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/corporate-guidelines.htn.
20 See Christopher A. Wray & Robert K. Hur, Corporate Criminal Prosecution in a Post-
Enron World: The Thompson Memo in Theory and Practice, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1095, 1170-71
(2006); McClure, supra note 16.
21 See Duggin, supra note 8, at 863-64.
22 See infra notes 104-109 and accompanying text.
23 See infra notes 104-109 and accompanying text.
24 McClure, supra note 16.
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Not surprisingly, DOJ's enhanced success was not well received
within the corporate world. As high-profile corporate executives fell in
domino-like fashion, corporations themselves bristled under the pres-
sure to cooperate or face indictment. Soon, a backlash against white
collar prosecutions began to take shape. The imperative to maintain a
positive public image meant that Corporate America could not directly
complain about governmental success in flushing out white collar
criminality. So, instead, corporations took aim at the government's tac-
tics. In particular, the business lobby, represented by the U.S. Chamber
of Commerce and other groups, initiated a public campaign against
DOJ's increasing insistence on the waiver of attorney-client privilege25
and work-product protection2 6 as part of an entity's cooperation.2 7 join-
ing forces with its attorneys, represented by the American Bar Associa-
tion (the "ABA"),28 the Association of Corporate Counsel, 29 and the
National Association of Criminal Defense Attorneys, the business lobby
complained that DOJ had created a "culture of waiver"30 that threat-
25 The attorney-client privilege protects against disclosure of communications between
an attorney and a client who is seeking or receiving legal advice. See United States v. U.S.
Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358-59 (D. Mass. 1950); see alsoJohn EX. Peloso & Jeffrey D.
Brooks, The Thompson Memorandum vs. the Attorney-Client Privilege: Where Things Stand, 1 White
Collar Crime Rep. (BNA) No. 19, at 623 (Oct. 13, 2006) (describing contours of privilege).
26 The work-product doctrine protects an attorney's work product-thoughts, mental
impressions, and strategies-against disclosure in a litigious setting unless the opposing
party can show an extraordinary need. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 508-09 (1947);
see also Peloso & Brooks, supra note 25, at 624. From this point forward, this Article will
employ the term "attorney-client privilege" to include that privilege as well as work-
product protection because, for the issues raised herein, there is no need to distinguish
between the two.
27 See McClure, supra note 16.
28 The ABA set up a Task Force on the Attorney-Client Privilege in October 2004. Al-
though the mission of the Task Force was ostensibly to examine the balance between the
privilege and competing interests, the position it would take was undoubtedly a fait accom-
pli: the press release announcing the creation of the Task Force was titled "ABA President
Robert Grey Creates Task Force to Advocate for Attorney Client Privilege." See Peloso &
Brooks, supra note 25, at 625 (emphasis added). In August 2005, the ABA House of Dele-
gates unanimously adopted a resolution opposed to the practice of privilege waiver. Id. at
626. See generally American Bar Association Task Force on Attorney-Client Privilege Report to House
of Delegates, in 38TH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES REGULATION (PLI Corp. Law and
Practice Course Handbook Series No. 9151, 2006), WL 1571 PLI/Corp 723.
2 See Peloso & Brooks, supra note 25, at 626 (describing the actions taken by the Asso-
ciation of Corporate Counsel in opposition to privilege waiver).
30 See Leonard Orland, The McNulty Memorandum: Not a Real Remedy, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 1,
2007, at 27 (discussing the Senate Judiciary Committee hearings in September 2006, dur-
ing which "a broad coalition of business and legal organizations argued that the Thomp-
son memo created a 'culture of waiver'"); Edward Iwata, Justice Toughens Rules on Corporate
Probes, USA TODAY, Dec. 13, 2006, at 1B (quoting FrederickJ. Krebs, President of the Asso-
ciation of Corporate Counsel, as claiming that the McNulty Memorandum "will not put an
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ened the very existence of the time-honored attorney-client privilege.31
By framing the issue as one of the government intruding on fundamen-
tal rights, the business lobby was able to attract liberal groups such as
the American Civil Liberties Union into its coalition, unimaginatively
named the Coalition to Preserve the Attorney-Client Privilege (the
"Coalition") .32 The battle over attorney-client privilege waiver was thus
underway.
At first, the Department stood its ground. But the combination of
business, lawyers, and civil rights groups proved too strong a force to
resist. The Coalition took its case to Congress, prompting hearings at
which the new Deputy Attorney General, Paul McNulty, found himself
under sustained attack.33 Soon thereafter, Senator Arlen Specter intro-
duced a bill that would prohibit government attorneys from asking a
corporation to waive its attorney-client privilege or using its failure to
waive as a factor in deciding whether to bring charges or determine its
degree of cooperation. 34 Reading the handwriting on the wall, 35 on De-
cember 12, 2006, McNulty issued a revised memorandum on the sub-
end to the 'culture of waiver' that exists within the DOJ"). Waiver critics support their "cul-
ture of waiver" characterization by pointing to a March 2006 study by the Association of
Corporate Counsel and the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, which re-
vealed that seventy-five percent of corporate counsel believed that prosecutors routinely
demanded waiver of privilege as evidence that a company was cooperating. See McLure,
supra note 16. In light of the obvious bias of the surveyors and the population surveyed,
this statistic is meaningless. Moreover, the survey was conducted prior to the McNulty
Memorandum's adjustments to prior policy.
31 See McClure, supra note 16 (stating that the "Coalition to Preserve the Attorney-
Client Privilege ... could easily be cast as an alliance of big business and defense lawyers
merely pushing back at an aggressive government crackdown on fraud").
s2 Id. The Coalition was also able to garner the support of ten former senior DOJ offi-
cials, including a number of former U.S. Attorneys General. See FormerFederal Prosecutors Want
Changes in DOJ Client Privilege Policy, 75 U.S. L. Wk. (BNA) 2131, 2131-32 (Sept. 12, 2006).
This was a public relations coup. No one pointed out, however, that many of the former DOJ
officials were now working in the private sector representing big business; one suspects, but
cannot prove, that others signed on to the cause based upon the vast array of groups and
individuals who were already on board, without giving the issue a great deal of critical
thought.
33 See The Thompson Memorandum's Effect on the Right to Counsel Corporate Investigations:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 835 (2006); Mclure, supra note 16,
at *3-4; see also Peloso & Brooks, supra note 25, at 627-28 (describing House Judiciary
subcommittee hearings held on March 7, 2006, and Senate Judiciary Committee hearings
held on September 12, 2006).
34 Technically, the bill was not formally introduced; instead, Senator Specter brought it
to the Senate floor and placed it in the Congressional Record. 152 CONG. REc. S1 1438-39
(daily ed. Dec. 7, 2006) (statement of Sen. Specter).
35 See Attorney-Client Privilege: Revised DOJ Policy Limits Consideration of Privilege Waivers in
Criminal Matters, I White Collar Crime Rep. (BNA) No. 24, at 763 (Dec. 22, 2006) (noting
that the new policy was in response to widespread and mounting criticism).
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ject to all DOJ attorneys.36 The McNulty Memorandum makes clear
that (1) a corporation can cooperate without waiving its privilege if it
can provide the necessary information through other means; (2) waiver
requests should be made only if there is a "legitimate need"; and (3)
waiver requests require high-level supervisory approval, which varies
depending upon the sensitivity of the information sought.37
The McNulty Memorandum failed in its bid to satisfy Coalition
members. They stated that it did not go far enough and claimed that
the proper resolution of the issue was a total ban on waiver requests,
as provided in the Specter bill.3 8 As a result, Specter reintroduced his
proposed legislation at the opening of the next Congress.3 9 The battle
over attorney-client privilege waiver rages on.
This Article joins the fray. As the Introduction suggests, this Arti-
cle is skeptical toward the motives of those who seek to remove the
powerful weapon of waiver requests from the prosecution's arsenal. At
the same time, it recognizes that the attorney-client privilege is central
to the American system of justice because of the critical functions it
serves. Certain prosecutorial tactics during the Thompson Memoran-
dum era did go too far in upsetting the balance between governmen-
tal power and individual rights. The goal of this Article is to go be-
yond the rhetoric resorted to by individuals on both sides of the
debate and examine, fairly and in detail, the ramifications of privilege
waiver.4° The point of reference is the public's best interest, meaning
36 See generally Memorandum from Paul J. McNulty, Deputy Attorney Gen., to Heads of
Department Components and U.S. Attorneys (Dec. 12, 2006) [hereinafter McNulty Memo-
randum], available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/speeches/2O06/mcnultymemo.pdf.
37 Id. at 8-10.
38 See Marcia Coyle, The "McNulty Memo": Real Change or Retreat?, NAT'L LJ., Dec. 18-20,
2006, at 25 (discussing reactions to the McNulty Memorandum); Andrew Weissmann & Ana
R. Bugan, The McNulty Memorandum, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 5, 2007, at 12 (arguing that the McNulty
Memorandum does not go far enough); Press Release, Am. Bar Ass'n, Statement by ABA
President Karen J. Mathis Regarding Revisions to the Justice Department's Thompson
Memorandum (Dec. 12, 2006), http://www.abanet.org/abanet/media/statement/state-
ment.cfm?releaseid=59 (stating that the McNulty Memorandum is "but a modest improve-
ment" that "falls far short" of what is needed to prevent further erosion of the attorney-client
privilege).
39 Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act of 2007, S. 186, 110th Cong. (2007). When
reintroducing the legislation, Senator Specter stated that "[t] here is no need to wait and
see how the McNulty memorandum will operate in practice. The flaws in that memoran-
dum are already apparent." Sen. Specter Continues Efforts to Force DOJ to Stop Seeking Corporate
Waiver of Privilege, 1 White Collar Crime Rep. (BNA) No. 26, at 827 (Jan. 19, 2007) [here-
inafter Sen. Specter Continues Efforts].
40 This Article will refer to the process through which federal prosecutors ask for or
demand that a corporation waive its attorney-client privilege to get the full benefit of co-
operation simply as "privilege waiver." In so doing, it declines to adopt the more biased
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the interest of taxpayers and shareholders, not the narrow interest of
corporations, corporate or defense counsel, or federal prosecutors.
The conclusion is that the new position staked out by the Department
in the McNulty Memorandum, with some important caveats, deserves
a chance to work.41
Part I of this Article sets out and defends the fundamental proposi-
tion that, given the right set of circumstances, the power to prosecute a
corporate entity and the corporation's resultant cooperation are public
goods.42 Part II examines in detail how full cooperation by a corpora-
tion often requires it to waive its attorney-client privilege. 43 In Part In,
the Article addresses the arguments typically raised against privilege
waivers, including: (1) they will result in fewer internal corporate inves-
tigations; (2) they will decrease the effectiveness of internal investiga-
tions because corporate employees will not speak with counsel; (3) as a
result of factors (1) and (2), they will actually increase overall corporate
criminality; and (4) they will erode corporate employees' rights under
the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.44 This Part
will demonstrate that, although there is some legitimate basis for con-
cern, these arguments do not compel a blanket prohibition against _
waiver requests. 45 Rather, they indicate that certain good practices by
corporate counsel, extending beyond the present ethical requirements,
are necessary to protect the rights of employees caught in the midst of
an internal investigation. In addition, these arguments highlight the
necessity of tempering prosecutorial zeal in this arena by making waiver
requests a last resort rather than a precondition to cooperation. More-
terminology of "coerced privilege waiver" employed by other commentators. See, e.g.,
RobertJ. Jossen & Phillip M. Meyer, Recent Developments in Securities Cases and Investigations,
in SECURITIES LmGATION & ENFORCEMENT INsTrTUTE 2006, at 953 (PLI Corp. Law and
Practice Course Handbook Series No. 8805, 2006), WL 1557 PLI/Corp 933.
41 The McNulty Memorandum's Effect on The Right to Counsel in Corporate Investigations:
Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security of the Comm. on the
Judiciary, 17-23 (2007) (statement of Barry M. Sabin, Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen., Criminal
Div., Dep't of Justice) [hereinafter Statement of Barry M. Sabin]. Although this Article
focuses on the DOJ's position regarding privilege waiver and its effect on criminal prosecu-
tions, it is noted that other government agencies, such as the Securities and Exchange
Commission, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, the Environmental Protection
Agency, the Department of Defense, and the Department of Health and Human Services,
have adopted similar policies on privilege waiver in connection with their civil enforce-
ment authority. See Liesa L. Richter, Corporate Salvation or Damnation? Proposed New Federal
Legislation on Selective Waiver, 76 FORDHAM L. Rxv. 129, 141-42 (2007).
12 See infra notes 48-120 and accompanying text.
43 See infra notes 121-146 and accompanying text.
"See infra notes 147-232 and accompanying text.
I See infra notes 147-232 and accompanying text.
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over, these arguments point the way to an area of real concern: where
prosecutors and a cooperating corporation team up in real time to pres-
sure employees to waive their constitutional protections, thus exercising
a force that neither player could muster without the other. This practice,
which so exorcised Judge Lewis Kaplan in the 2006 case of United States
v. Stein,46 should, indeed, be proscribed. It is the subject of Part IV.47
I. CORPORATE PROSECUTIONS
A. Constitutional Authority, Doctrinal Requirements,
and Discretionary Factors
The U.S. Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of corporate
criminal prosecution in the 1909 case of New York Central & Hudson
River Railroad v. United States.48 According to subsequent case law, a cor-
poration is liable for the criminal acts of any of its agents or employees
if the agent committed the crime within the scope of employment and
acted, at least in part, for the benefit of the corporation. 49 The breadth
of this definition provides prosecutors with vast discretion to determine
whether, and under what circumstances, to charge a corporation for
criminality in its midst. No one would seriously argue, for example, that
Best Buy should face indictment if one of its sales assistants, angling for
a promotion, were discovered lying to customers about the quality of a
given product to increase revenues in the employee's department. On
the other hand, it would be hard to argue against the indictment of a
corporation whose officers and directors were personally engaged in
wholesale fraud against the consuming or investing public. Determin-
ing the exact point at which a company should be charged for the acts
of its employees, however, is a very difficult undertaking.
46 435 F. Supp. 2d at 344-45.
47 See infra notes 233-269 and accompanying text.
- 212 U.S. 481, 481-82 (1909). One of the arguments before the Court in this case
was that, as fictitious entities, corporations could not, by definition, form criminal intent.
Id. at 492-93. The Court, of course, rejected this contention. Id. at 494-95. For a fascinat-
ing discussion of how corporations are more than simply the sum of the individuals who
make their parts, and thus how they can "do" things (including have intentions and break
the law), see John Braithwaite & Brent Fisse, On the Plausibility of Coiporate Crime Contro4 in
WHITE COLLAR CRIME: CLAssIc AND CONTEMPORARY VIEWS 432-49 (Gilbert Geis et al.
eds., 3d ed. 1995).
49 See United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of Cal., 138 F.3d 961, 970-71 (D.C. Cir.
1998), aff'd on other grounds, 526 U.S. 398 (1999); United States v. Am. Radiator & Standard
Sanitary Corp., 433 F.2d 174, 204-05 (3d Cir. 1970).
2008]
Boston College Law Review
Until the very end of the twentieth century, DOJ provided federal
prosecutors with little guidance for determining how to exercise their
discretion in this critical arena. This changed in 1999, when then-
Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder issued a memorandum to De-
partment attorneys on the subject.50 In 2003, then-Deputy Attorney
General Larry Thompson issued a memorandum of his own that af-
firmed and refined the principles of the Holder version.5 1 The Thomp-
son Memorandum laid out nine factors that a prosecutor should weigh
when deciding whether to indict a corporation: (1) the nature and se-
riousness of the offense, including the risk of harm to the public; (2)
the extent to which the wrongdoing was pervasive in the company, and
whether high level management, was complicit in it; (3) whether the
corporation was a recidivist; (4) whether the corporation had taken
steps voluntarily to disclose the wrongdoing, and the extent of its will-
ingness to cooperate in the investigation of individuals, including the
extent to which it was willing to waive attorney-client privilege and
work-product protection, if necessary; (5) whether the corporation had
a tough compliance program in place; (6) the extent to which the cor-
poration took remedial action once the criminality was discovered; (7)
the extent to which innocent people, such as employees and share-
holders, would suffer disproportionate harm from criminal enforce-
ment; (8) whether the prosecution of individuals responsible for the
malfeasance would be adequate; and (9) whether civil remedies existed
and would suffice. 52
B. Public Benefits of Corporate Criminal Liability
Setting aside for a moment the factors bearing on cooperation, if
the other factors line up the right way, prosecution (or at least the
threat of prosecution) of the corporate entity is in the public's inter-
est. Specifically, if (1) the criminality was serious, pervasive, and high-
reaching, (2) criminal prosecution would not unduly harm investors
and consumers, and (3) other remedies are either unavailable or in-
sufficient, then corporate criminal liability furthers a number of criti-
cal social goods.53
As an initial matter, corporate culpability achieves significant addi-
tional deterrence, specific and general, beyond that achieved solely by
50 See generally Holder Memorandum, supra note 15.
51 See generally Thompson Memorandum, supra note 19.
52 Id. at 2-3.
53 See infra notes 54-59 and accompanying text.
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the prosecution of individuals. Specifically, corporate liability deters
corporate officers from creating an atmosphere in which mid- and
lower-level employees know that criminal conduct is either tolerated or
encouraged, but which shields the officers themselves from liability.54
High-level management can generate this situation in a number of
ways; one method is to set sales or other targets so high that they can-
not be met through legal means and then fire or demote employees
who fail to meet these unrealistic targets. 55 Employees quickly under-
stand what they need to do to keep their jobs and get promoted, while
management hides behind a veil of plausible deniability. Later, if
criminal proceedings are initiated and lower-level employees get
caught, management can point to the fact that it never sanctioned
criminal activity and was not aware of its existence. It can go even fur-
ther and throw a couple of minor employees to the prosecution wolves,
claiming that they were rogues and that their termination (and prose-
cution) has cured the problem. Meanwhile, the managers-the true
rogues-continue their way up the sleazy corporate ladder.
Entity prosecution helps to reverse this equation. If managers
obliquely encourage widespread criminality and the entity gets caught,
prosecution of the corporation means that the entity will pay a price. It
will suffer a loss of reputation and perhaps even lost revenues, mone-
tary penalties, and debarment. Harm to the corporation means harm
to the officers. They may lose their jobs or at least suffer monetary
losses such as a reduction in the value of their stock portfolios and per-
haps the loss of future salary increases or bonuses. Certainly, their pro-
fessional reputations will be forever tainted. Given these prospects, pre-
venting-as opposed to encouraging--criminality within the corpora-
tion looks to the officers like the better path to choose.
Of course, nothing deters a white collar criminal more than the
prospect of serving time in prison. Thus, for deterrence purposes,
prosecutors place an emphasis on having both tools at their disposal:
54 See FRANCIs T. CULLEN ET AL., CORPORATE CRIME UNDER ATrACK 352 (1987) ("The
existence of corporate criminal liability also provides an incentive for top officers to super-
vise middle- and lower-level management more closely.").
55 See United States v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 848 F. Supp. 287, 291 (D. Mass. 1994) ("This is a
case in which a pervasive and powerful corporate culture exalted the value of profit above
the value of human life."); see alsoJohn Greenwald, Rank and Fire, TIME, June 18, 2001, at
38 (noting that Enron had the policy of annually firing the bottom fifteen percent of its
workforce regardless of their performance).
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individual liability, when it tan be proved, and corporate liability as a
vital complement to it.56
Corporate liability also plays an important role in the area of victim
restitution. Often, white collar prosecutions involve millions--even
hundreds of millions or billions-of dollars of fraud.5 7 Convicted indi-
viduals rarely have at their disposal anything near the amount of money
necessary to pay restitution to the victims of the crime. The corporate
entity, however, is a potential deep pocket. Given that the risk of corpo-
rate criminality is priced into the market, it is not unfair to make the
entity (and thus its shareholders) responsible for repaying the victims,
if possible.58
In addition, the threat of criminal liability gives corporations an
incentive to set up compliance programs with real teeth in them. Ab-
sent criminal liability, the decision whether to comply with the law is
simply a matter of dollars and cents: is compliance more or less costly
than the cost of fines and penalties (multiplied by the risk of getting
caught)? Criminal liability, with its negative stigma, raises the stakes to a
higher level, and one much more difficult to measure. It is hard to es-
timate in advance the degree to which a criminal conviction will harm a
corporation's bottom line; indeed, in the very rare case, criminal con-
viction can effectively be a "death penalty."59 The resultant uncertainty
undoubtedly makes corporate officers much more risk adverse, increas-
56 See C.R. Bard, 848 F. Supp. at 290 ("It is... essential in a case like this [where corpo-
rate fraud caused great risk to the public] ... that individuals, as well as corporations be
the target of criminal prosecution.").
57 For example, some have estimated the Enron fraud to be in the neighborhood of $20
billion. See William Lerach & Al Meyerhoff, Why Insiders Get Rich, and the Little Guy Loses
(Jan. 20, 2002), http://www.enronfraud.com/insidervslitle.html. WorldCom paid a fine of
$750 million based upon its estimated $11 billion fraud, and Qwest Communications paid a
$250 million fine based upon its fraudulent accounting amounting to $3.8 billion. See Settle-
ment News: Qwest Engaged in Fraud, SEC Says-Regulators Claim Misdeeds Were Led by Top Officials;
Firm to Pay $250 Million Fine, WALL ST. J., Oct. 22, 2004, at A3. Fraud of this magnitude is not
confined to securities cases: Columbia/HCA settled its healthcare fraud case with the gov-
ernment in 2000 for $745 million. See Columbia/HCA Settles Fraud Charge, CBS NEws, May 18,
2000, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2000/05/18/national/rriain197023.shtml.
5 Although not classically considered a goal of the criminal justice system, restitution has
become an increasingly important function in recent years. See Criminal Restitution Improve-
ment Act of 2006: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security of the H.
Committee on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 1 (2006) (statement of Rep. Howard Coble) (claiming
that restitution "plays a critical role in the deterrence and rehabilitation of offenders").
59 Though this does not happen nearly as often as those opposing attorney-client privi-
lege waiver like to claim. See infra notes 86-98 and accompanying text (discussing Arthur
Andersen case).
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ing the attractiveness of implementing procedures and hiring experts
to assure legal and regulatory compliance.
Finally, the threat of entity liability provides prosecutors with lever-
age to encourage the corporation to cooperate with the investigation.
Because this issue bears directly on the heart of the matter-attorney-
client privilege waivers-it is taken up separately in the next Section. 60
C. Public Benefits of Corporate Cooperation
1. Costs of Prosecuting White Collar Crime
The prosecution of white collar crime can be slow, resource-
intensive work. There are numerous reasons for this. First, the crime
itself is often very complex.61 Indeed, sophisticated white collar crimi-
nals frequently do all they can to add to the complexity of their crime
by disguising what they did beneath layers of accounting tricks, false or
fraudulent transactions, deleted records, and second sets of books.62 In
a case of any significance, investigators might face hundreds of thou-
sands-if not millions-of pages of documents, increasingly in elec-
tronic form, that they must sort through to unravel the criminal behav-
ior.63 This work might take a team of investigative agents, at least some
of whom are trained accountants, and one or more prosecutors years to
carry out.64
60 See infra notes 61-101 and accompanying text.
61 See Lisa Kern Griffim, Compelled Cooperation and the New Corporate Criminal Procedure, 82
N.Y.U. L. REv. 311, 340 (2007) (noting complexity of corporate fraud).
62 SeeJim McGee, War on Crime Expands U.S. Prosecutors' Powers: Aggressive Tactics Put
Fairness at Issue, WASH. POST, Jan. 10, 1993, at Al (quoting former Attorney General Rich-
ard Thornburgh as stating, "You're trying to get every edge you can on those people who
are devising increasingly more intricate schemes to rip off the public....").
63 See, e.g., United States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 362 (S.D.N.Y 2006) (describing
how discovery in this tax fraud case amounted to 5 to 6 million pages of documents plus
transcripts of 335 depositions and 195 income tax returns); James Bandler & Kara Scan-
nell, In Options Probes, Private Law Firms Play Crucial Role: As More Than 130 Companies Come
Under Scrutiny, Government Relies on Help, WALL. ST. J., Oct. 28, 2006, at Al (noting that,
during the internal investigation into allegations of options back-dating by UnitedHealth
Group, counsel examined almost 4 million documents and conducted roughly 80 inter-
views); Statement of Stephen S. Trott, Assistant Attorney Gen., Criminal Div., Before the
Subconun. on Crime of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, Concerning E.F. Hutton Case,
Dec. 6 & 11, 1985, reprinted in KATHLEEN F. BRICKEY, CORPORATE AND WHITE COLLAR
CRIME, CASES AND MATERIALS 734, 734 (4th ed. 2007) ('The investigation covered 3 years
and ultimately involved the analysis of 7,000,000 documents.").
64 See Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 371 ("The government has spent years investigating the
case, presumably reviewing millions of pages of documents and interviewing scores of
witnesses if not more.").
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Second, white collar cases are often not open and shut. Many
times, the key question will be whether the individual defendants, and
thus the corporation, harbored the requisite criminal intent.65 The
typical defendant will plead good faith or advice of counsel.6 6 Specifi-
cally, the defendant might claim that the action in question was a close
accounting call, but that he was comfortable it fell on the right side of
the law. Alternatively, the defendant will contend that he approved the
transaction, or the manner in which it was recorded on the company's
books and records, only after carefully consulting with the corpora-
tion's accountants and legal counsel. In cases in which the prosecution
alleges that the defendant stole from the company, the defendant is
very likely to claim that the compensation at issue was approved by the
board of directors, or that some other corporate employee was the true
culprit.67
These kinds of defenses are unique to white collar crimes; a bank
robber, for instance, cannot plead ignorance of the law68 or claim that
the bank approved of his (illicit) withdrawal. 69 Moreover, these defenses
are difficult to overcome. At minimum, they require extensive inter-
views with the accountants, lawyers, and directors involved. If these in-
dividuals are not inclined to be cooperative, they must be subpoenaed
to the grand jury and perhaps even granted immunity. This process can
6 See Gilber Geis et al., Medicaid Fraud, in WHITE COLLAR CRIME: CLASSIC AND CONTEM-
PORARY VIEWS, supra note 48, at 250 (quoting a Medicaid fraud investigator claiming that
intent is the most difficult thing to prove in such cases). See generaly Michael L. Seigel, Bring-
ing Coherence to Mens Rea Anasis for Securities-Related Offenses, 2006 Wis. L. REv. 1563 (discuss-
ing the criminal intent necessary to prove several securities-related criminal offenses).
66 See Seigel, supra note 65, at 1609-10 (discussing good faith and advice of counsel de-
fenses).
67 For example, Dennis Kozlowski employed the former defense in the Tyco case. See
Dan Ackerman, Tyco Trial II: Verdict First, Law Second, FORBES.COM, June 17, 2005, http://
www:forbes.com/business/2005/06/17/kozlowski-tyco-verdict-cx da_0617tycover-dict.htrrd
(discussing the jury's rejection of Kozlowski's defense that what he took from the company
was authorized).
68 In general, ignorance or mistake of the criminal law is not a defense. See People v.
Marrero, 507 N.E.2d 1068, 1070 (N.Y 1987); MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(9) (1962). In
certain types of white collar cases, including securities fraud tax fraud, it is. See Cheek v.
United States, 498 U.S. 192, 198 (1991) (holding that prosecution must prove that defen-
dant knew he was violating tax code for criminal conviction); Seigel, supra note 65, at
1579-80 (analyzing statutes and cases and concluding that for securities crimes the term
"willfully" imports a 'weak" mistake of law defense).
6 See Ackerman, supra note 67 (discussing the Tyco H/ trial, in which "board members
testified that they had no intention of paying certain bonuses or permitting the company
to buy Kozlowski multimillion-dollar homes, as it did. The jury apparently believed the
board members and disbelieved Swartz and Kozlowski .... ').
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take months and even years. 70 In addition, overcoming typical white
collar defenses requires prosecutors to seek the advice of experts in the
field and prepare the experts for possible testimony at trial. 71
Third, white collar defendants, especially major corporations and
the individuals associated with them, usually have the resources to hire
excellent attorneys who specialize in white collar criminal defense. 72
These attorneys have the ability to slow down an investigation to a con-
siderable extent if they so choose. They can object to subpoenas duces
tecum on a whole host of grounds, forcing repeated hearings relating to
subpoena enforcement.73 They can claim attorney-client privilege and
work-product protection of the documents subject to a subpoena, re-
quiring the establishment of a system to filter out challenged docu-
ments to obtain a ruling from the court before government agents may
see them. 74 Defense counsel can advise their clients not to give volun-
tary statements to government investigators and to exercise their Fifth
Amendment right not to testify before the grand jury absent immu-
nity.75 If they are coordinating their efforts through a joint defense
agreement, counsel can ensure that this lack of cooperation is wide-
spread, if not universal, forcing prosecutors to decide which potential
witnesses to immunize in a situation of substantial uncertainty- some-
thing they are hesitant to do.76 Unless it is fueled by a whistleblower or
other inside information, these tactics can slow an investigation to a
snail's pace, and perhaps even cause it to stall altogether.
70 See, e.g., Bandler & Scannell, supra note 63.
71 See P.J. Meid, Who's the Boss? Prosecutorial Involvement in Corporate America, 34 N. Ky. L.
REv. 1, 25 (2007).
72 The corporation will, of course, be able to tap into its revenues to pay its attorneys;
in addition, employees and agents of the corporation may be entitled to indemnification
of attorneys' fees, meaning that they can get far more expensive representation than they
might personally be able to afford. See Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 340.
73 See JEROLD H. ISRAEL ET AL., WHITE COLLAR CRIME: LAW AND PRACTICE 347-73,
648-93 (2d ed. 2003) (describing various objections to grand jury subpoenas).
74 See The Thompson Memorandum's Effect on the Right to Counsel in Corporate Investigations:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 117-18 (2006) (statement of Paul J.
McNulty, Deputy Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't ofJustice) [hereinafter Statement of PaulJ. McNulty]
(discussing how corporate counsel can use privilege as a sword if they so choose).
75 See Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 559 (1892) (holding that the Fifth
Amendment applies to grand jury proceedings); see also ISRAEL ET AL., supra note 73, at
600-47 (discussing testimonial act of production privilege).
76 See Richard M. Cooper, A Closer Look at the ABA's Opposition to the Thompson Memo,
Bus. CRIMES BULLETIN, Nov. 17, 2006, http://www.law.com/jsp/ihc/PubArticleHC.jsp?id
=1163671527732 (discussing joint defense agreements).
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One observer calls this the "delaying game"77 and describes it in
part as follows:
A corporation will often refuse to voluntarily turn over data
and documents requested by government regulatory agen-
cies, thus forcing a time-consuming legal battle to obtain the
information. If a court orders that the information actually be
divulged, the alternative tactic of "overcompliance" is com-
monly used .... Our review of the antitrust actions against
the petroleum industry showed how that industry used an al-
most endless chain of legal appeals and maneuvers to bog
down understaffed government agencies. The effectiveness of
this tactic can be seen in the FYC's capitulation in the Exxon
case, when the government openly admitted that it gave up
because the case would take too long to pursue. 78
Fourth, the difficult nature of white collar investigation means
that it often must be prosecuted bit by bit, as prosecutors unravel the
wrongdoing and work their way up the corporate ladder.79 Charges
are first brought against the lower-level employees, who are much
more likely to have been caught red-handed, with the hope that their
indictment or conviction will lead to cooperation against mid-level
management. If this succeeds, the mid-level managers are prosecuted
with the hope that they will implicate responsible corporate officers at
the highest level. If so, prosecutors can finally bring these individuals
to justice. The whole process can take many years;a° even then, plead-
ing ignorance or good faith, the highest level managers undoubtedly
have the best chance of either escaping conviction8 l or having their
conviction overturned on appeal.8 2
7 7 JAMES WILLIAM COLEMAN, THE CRIMINAL ELITE: UNDERSTANDING WHITE COLLAR
CRIME 172 (5th ed. 2002).
78 Id. at 172-73.
79 An example of this process at work is the Enron investigation. Prosecutors made
cases against lower level employees until they were finally in a position to indict (and con-
vict) Jeffrey Skilling, the CFO, and Kenneth Lay, the CEO. SeeJohnson, supra note 10 (de-
scribing how the Enron Task Force worked its way up Enron's chain of command).
8 The process took two and half years in the Enron case. See id.
81 For example, in a result that shocked many, HealthSouth founder and CEO Richard
M. Scrushy was acquitted of all charges using this defense. See Carrie Johnson, Jury Acquits
HealthSouth Founder of All Charges, WASH. POST, June 29, 2005, at Al (reporting on acquittal
and reactions to it).
82 See, e.g., United States v. Whiteside, 285 F.3d 1345, 1346 (11th Cir. 2002) (reversing
Medicare fraud convictions of high level corporate defendants on grounds that the regula-
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If the cases are not settled through guilty pleas, each jury trial in a
white collar case is likely to be time-consuming and expensive. Prosecu-
tors almost inevitably must introduce a massive amount of documen-
tary evidence, along with the testimony of dozens of witnesses, often
including forensic accounting and other experts. Highly paid defense
counsel will conduct extensive and often effective cross-examinations of
the government's witnesses. After the government rests, the defense is
very likely to put on a case of its own. In light of the fact that the de-
fendant probably has no prior criminal record and may even be an up-
standing citizen of the community (apart from the criminal conduct
alleged in the case), she is free to take the witness stand to proffer her
ignorance or good faith defense. Defense experts may be called to re-
but the opinions of the prosecution experts. Sometimes, defense coun-
sel will line up a parade of good character witnesses to testify to the de-
fendant's honest, law-abiding nature.83
Critics of privilege waiver frequently refer to the power of the
federal government and the vast tools at its disposal to crush corpo-
rate criminal defendants who fail to cooperate.84 They contend that
the mere indictment of a company can easily be a death sentence, giv-
ing prosecutors far too much leverage to coerce corporations into
pre-indictment cooperation and waiver.85 Often they bolster this ar-
gument by reference to the prosecution of the accounting firm Ar-
thur Andersen in connection with its role in the Enron affair.86 After
refusing to cooperate, Andersen was indicted for obstructing justice
by destroying an untold number of documents when it learned that
the Securities and Exchange Commission (the "SEC") was contem-
plating an investigation of Enron's accounting practices. 8 7 Immedi-
tions were too vague to support mens rea of knowingly and willfully submitting false docu-
ments).
83 See FED. R. EVID. 404(a) (permitting criminal defendants to put on evidence of their
good character).
84 See Richter, supra note 41, at 13 ("Several groups suggest that corporate clients are
unable to resist the pressure for waivers from the behemoth power that is the Department
ofJustice, making waivers by cooperating companies coerced and involuntary.").
1 See Orland, supra note 30, at 27 (noting that "faced with the stark reality that corpo-
rate indictment could mean corporate death, corporations now routinely capitulate");
Wray & Hur, supra note 20, at 1097 ("Because indictment often amounts to a virtual death
sentence for business entities .... ").
86 See Orland, supra note 30, at 27; Wray & Hur, supra note 20, at 1097.
87 See Arthur Andersen, LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 698-702 (2005) (setting
forth the facts of at issue); see also Arthur Andersen Indicted in Enron Probe, NEWSMAX.COM
WIRES, Mar. 15, 2002, http://www.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2002/3/14/170156.
shtml (discussing Arthur Andersen allegations in indictment).
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ately upon indictment, Andersen's clients abandoned ship and, not
long after, the firm collapsed. 88 Waiver critics often note that Ander-
sen's conviction was overturned by the Supreme Court,89 implying
that the entire prosecution was ill-founded and that Andersen was
thus "hanged" without cause.90
Despite the claims of critics, the Andersen case provides little
support for their position. The collapse of the firm as a result of being
indicted was the exception, not the rule. The best evidence of this is
the huge number of corporations that have been charged (or have
settled charges) over the years that have lived on to produce their
widgets for another day.91 Andersen's situation was unique because, as
a firm specializing in public accounting, it was subject to the loss of its
ability to conduct public audits upon conviction. 92 The value of an
audit to a publicly traded company rests on the reputation of the firm
certifying it. Once Andersen was indicted, its clients no longer be-
lieved it had the credibility necessary to do its job-even if it were
eventually exonerated.93 These factors are simply not present in the
run-of-the-mill corporate case.
In addition, Andersen suffered because it was a multiple recidivist:
it had recently settled with the government in connection with numer-
88 See Stephen Taub, Abandon Ship? More Companies Bail on Andersen, CFO.coM, Feb. 13,
2002, http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/3003418?f= search.
89 Arthur Andersen, 544 U.S. at 707-08 (reversing conviction and remanding case).
90 See Griffin, supra note 61, at 327, 340-42, (referring to Arthur Andersen in arguing
that companies have no bargaining power against the government; claiming that the Su-
preme Court's opinion contained a subtext that "not quite all is fair in the war on corpo-
rate crime").
91 See e.g., Russell Mokhiber, Top 100 Corporate Criminals of the Decade, CoRP. CRIME REP.,
http://www.corporatecrimereporter.com/topl00.htmil (last visited Oct. 12, 2007) (listing top
100 corporate criminals of the 1990s, with many on the list-including Exxon; Archers
Daniel Midland; Pfizer, Inc.; Rockwell International Corporation; Royal Caribbean Cruise
Lines; Teledyne Industries, Inc.; Northrop; Warner-Lambert Company, General Electric;
Chevron; Tyson Foods, Inc.; ALCOA, United States Sugar Corporation; Bristol-Myers Squibb;
Consolidated Edison Company, Hyundai Motor Company, and Samsung America, Inc.-still
very much in existence today); Penelope Patsuris, The Corporate Scandal Sheet, FORBES.COM,
Aug. 26, 2002, http://www.forbes.com/home/2002/07/25/accoun-tingtracker.html (listing
twenty-two corporate frauds, most involving claims against the corporate entity, that came to
light between June 2000 and April 2002; many of the companies on the list-including AOL
Time Warner, Halliburton, and Merck-are still in operation).
9 See Penelope Patsuris, Andersen Clients Evacuate Post-Verdict FORBES.COM, Aug. 14,
2002, http://www.forbes.com/2002/03/13/O313andersen.html (reporting that the firm
was required to stop auditing clients as of August 31, 2002).
93 See ICFAI Ctr. for Mgmt. Research, Fall of Arthur Andersen (2002), http://www.
icmr.icfaLorg/casestudies/catalogue/Business%20Ethics/BECGO27.htm (discussing how
Andersen's clients and some employees abandoned it after its indictment) [hereinafter
ICFAI Ctr.].
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ous other claims of wrongdoing.9 4 The Enron debacle was the final
straw.95 Finally, the contention that the firm was exonerated on appeal
is incorrect. The Supreme Court held that the trial judge's jury instruc-
tions on the criminal intent required for conviction were erroneous,
and it remanded the case for a new trial.96 The Court did not enter a
judgment of acquittal. 97 Presumably, prosecutors did not retry the case
because by the time it came back on remand the firm was more or less
defunct.98
Nevertheless, there can be no doubt that federal prosecutors are
powerful and that corporate defendants are fearful of indictment, es-
pecially when conviction may lead to serious collateral consequences.99
This characterization of the situation, however, must be tempered by a
realistic look at the resources of the opposing parties. Although on pa-
per one side is the "United States of America," the resources devoted by
the federal government to any given case is necessarily constrained.
The prosecution team likely consists of one or two prosecutors and
9 See ArthurAndersen, 544 U.S. at 699 n.2 (describing Andersen'sJune 2001 settlement
with the SEC and the fact that one of its partners had been named in an SEC complaint
filed in yet another case in July 2001); see also ICFAI Ctr., supra note 93 (describing Ander-
sen's role in "various instances of business fraud by its clients, namely, Sunbeam, Waste
Management Inc., Qwest Communications, Global Crossing, and Baptist Foundation of
Arizona").
95 See Arthur Andersen, 544 U.S. at 699 n.2.
96 See id. at 707-08.
97 See id.
98 See Terry Frieden, Arthur Andersen Avoids CriminalRap, CNNMONEY.coM, Nov. 23, 2005,
http://money.cnn.com/2005/11/23/news/midcaps/arthurandersen/index.htm (reporting
that prosecutors had filed papers announcing their decision not to re-prosecute). The An-
dersen prosecution was difficult in part because no existing obstruction of justice stature
clearly covered the behavior in that case-destroying audit records in anticipation of a crimi-
nal investigation. For example, the omnibus obstruction provision, 18 U.S.C. § 1503, applies
only after a proceeding is already underway. See 18 U.S.C. § 1503 (2000); United States v.
Simmons, 591 F.2d 206, 210 (3d Cir. 1979). Thus, prosecutors had to stretch and charge the
company under 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b) for "corruptly persuad[ing] another person" to destroy
documents. See 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b) (2000) (amended 2002). In the Sarbanes-Oxley Act,
Congress made clear its view of Andersen's behavior by passing three additional obstruction
statutes directly aimed at making it clearly illegal in the future. 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b) (2000 &
Supp. IV 2004); see id. § 1512(c) (corruptly destroying documents with the intent to impair its
integrity or availability for use in official proceedings); id. § 1519 (destruction of documents
with the intent to impede a federal investigation or any matter within the jurisdiction of any
department or agency of the United States); id. § 1520 (destruction of corporate audit re-
cords).
99 Interestingly, constant repetition about the Andersen legacy appears to have caused
irrational fear among corporate executives and unwarranted bravado among prosecutors.
See Daniel Fisher & Peter Lattman, Ratted Out: That Reassuring Corporate Attorney Who Asked
You a Few Questions May Turn Out to Be the Long Arm of the Law, FORBES, July 4, 2005, at 49
(indicating that fear from the Andersen case lives on).
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three or four primary investigative agents, many of whom have other
investigations and cases to attend to in addition to the one at issue. 100
On the other side, representing the corporation and its employees are
numerous very experienced defense attorneys, along with paralegals,
investigators, and other assistants, collectively being paid a great sum of
money to thwart the government's investigation. All told, it is a rela-
tively fair fight.101
Finally, there are opportunity costs. Whenever DOJ is entangled
in an all-out brawl with an alleged corporate felon, the resources the
Department is expending on that particular case are resources that it
could be expending elsewhere, if the first company chose to settle.
This last point is developed at some length in the next Section.10 2
2. Benefits of Cooperation
a. Efficiency
In light of the difficulties of waging war against uncooperative cor-
porate targets, it should not be surprising that in recent years prosecu-
tors have become increasingly aggressive in seeking out their coopera-
100 1 hearken back to the days when I was prosecuting a huge Sicilian Mafia heroin ims-
portation and distribution case. See genera/!y United States v. Gambino, 728 F. Supp. 1150
(E.D. Pa. 1989), affd 926 F.2d 1355 (3d Cir. 1991). During a multi-year investigation, we
had recorded thousands of hours of wiretaps, during which the defendants spoke to each
other in Sicilian. At one point, the court, aggravated by how slow it was taking the prosecu-
tion to turn over transcripts of key conversations to the defense, threatened that the entire
prosecution team would be held in contempt unless the transcriptions were completed by
a certain date. When I protested that, with our lone Sicilian translator, the deadline would
be impossible to meet, the court responded, "Oh, come on Mr. Seigel. You are the United
States of America. You have unlimited resources at your disposal. You can do anything you
want." In fact, for purposes of this case, we had one interpreter, period. Luckily, he was an
extremely conscientious sole who worked round-the-clock for several days to get the task
done.
101 Indeed, some argue that, if any party is at a disadvantage in white collar investiga-
tions and prosecutions, it is the government. See COLEMAN, supra note 77, at 169 (discuss-
ing the paucity of federal resources, especially at times when a large scandal engulfs the
system); Mokhiber, supra note 91 (discussing the criminal prosecution of Royal Caribbean
Cruise Lines for illegal dumping during which two federal prosecutors faced a range of
opposing counsel and hired experts including Judson Starr and Jerry Block, both former
heads of DOJ's Environmental Crimes Section, former Attorneys General Benjamin
Civiletti and Eliot Richardson, former State Department Officials Terry Leitzell and Ber-
nard Oxman, University of Virginia Professor of Law John Norton Moore, former federal
prosecutors Kenneth C. Bass III and Norman Moscowitz, and Donald Carr of Winthrop &
Stimston).
102 See infra notes 104-120 and'accompanying text.
[Vol. 49:1
The Battle over Waiver of the Attorney-Client Privilege
tion.10s When a collective entity decides to be cooperative, the balance
of power shifts dramatically. No longer foes, the corporation and the
government can team up to unmask the individuals who were at the
center of the criminal activity, thereby getting to the heart of the matter
quickly and efficiently.
In the majority of cases, upon learning of possible criminal behav-
ior in its midst, a corporation conducts an internal investigation to de-
termine what happened and what to do about it.104 Upon reaching a
conclusion, the investigators make a report-either orally or in writ-
ing-to the corporation's officers or board of directors or both. Those
in charge then decide what remedial action, if any, to take.
In many cases, the internal investigation is substantially completed
by the time government agents come knocking at the corporation's
door. If so, the corporation is in an obvious position to be of significant
help to prosecutors if it chooses to cooperate with them. The corpora-
tion has already isolated the critical documents and witnesses, compiled
witness statements, and identified the likely culprits. If it willingly turns
this information over to the government, a great deal of time can be
shaved from the investigative phase of the criminal case. 10 5 The corpo-
ration can do other things to help as well, such as provide background
about the corporation, including its organizational structure and in-
house policies.10 6
With company cooperation, the successful completion of a com-
plex white collar prosecution, including resolution of corporate as well
as all individual charges, could very well be reduced from a matter of
years to a matter of months. This huge efficiency gain represents a sig-
103 See Robert Creamer, Criminal Law Concerns for Civil Lawyers, FED. LAW., May 2005,
34, 35 (2005).
104 See Duggin, supra note 8, at 884-87 (stating that conducting an internal investiga-
tion has become the standard of care whenever credible allegations of misconduct arise in
the corporate setting); David M. Zornow & Keith D. Krakaur, On the Brink of a Brave New
World: The Death of Privilege in Corporate Criminal Investigations, 37 Am. CRIM. L. REv. 147,
152 (2000) ("Upon learning of some potential criminal activity within its ranks, a corpora-
tion typically retains counsel to gather the facts, assesses [sic] those facts in light of the
relevant law, and furnishes [sic] advice about how to proceed from both legal and tactical
perspectives."); see also infra notes 175-212 and accompanying text (discussing internal
investigations in more detail).
105 See infra notes 175-212 and accompanying text.
106 See infra notes 175-212 and accompanying text.
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nificant public good.10 7 Far more white collar criminal behavior can be
attacked with the same amount of resources devoted to the effort.108
The efficiency argument is equally strong even when prosecutors
erroneously target an innocent company. The fastest way a company
can convince government agents of its innocence is to share all perti-
nent information with them so that they can draw this conclusion
themselves1 09
b. Remorse and Renunciation of Criminal Activity
There is more to be gained from cooperation, however, than
mere efficiency. In the noncorporate setting, an individual's coopera-
tion is seen as a sign that the defendant is willing to make a clean
break with the past through acceptance of responsibility and renun-
ciation of prior criminal behavior.11 0 Such public acts of remorse no
doubt serve two distinct goals. First, if there is any hope that the de-
fendant will give up his criminal ways, recognizing in public that what
he did was wrong and apologizing for it are a necessary psychological
start.1 Second, other criminals are much less likely to associate with
107 Oddly enough, even this seemingly uncontroversial claim has dissenters. Specifi-
cally, one group of commentators stands the past to put limits on governmental power and
forced the government
to make triage decisions in order to best allocate its resources for a particular
investigation .... The efficiency argument on its head, claiming that the lack
of government resources served in costliness of investigations, combined with
real budgetary limits, operated as a natural check on prosecutorial inquiries
that could otherwise have no bounds.
William R. McLucas et al., The Decline of the Attorney-Client Privilege in the Corporate Setting, 96
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 621, 639 (2006). They claim that the ability of the government
to leverage its resources through corporate cooperation takes away these "historical checks
and balances." Id. This position makes sense, however, only if one believes that, prior to
the Holder Memorandum, the government was prosecuting an optimal amount of white
collar crime, which seems to be a belief that only big firm corporate lawyers (such as these
authors) would hold.
108 See Richter, supra note 41, at 27-28 (discussing the successful results of corporate
cooperation in criminal cases in recent years).
109 See Statement of Paul J. McNulty, supra note 74, at 115 (arguing that it is good prac-
tice for all concerned for a company claiming innocence to share the results of its internal
investigation with prosecutors to satisfy them of this fact).
110 See Stephen J. Morse, Reasons, Results and Crimninal Responsibility, 2004 U. ILL. L . REv.
363, 392-93.
111 Stephanos Bibas & Richard A. Bierschbach, Integrating Remorse and Apology into Crimi-
nal Procedure, 114 YALE L.J. 85, 104 (2004) ("Remorse and apology are not simply tools for
diagnosing the appropriate punishments for individual defendants. They can heal .... ").
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an individual who has pleaded guilty and cooperated with the au-
thorities in the past.112
These rationales must be tailored a bit to fit the corporate setting.
By cooperating, those in charge of the company signal to the com-
pany's workforce in no uncertain terms that illegal behavior is not ac-
ceptable. Cooperation lets the criminals in the organization know that,
although the company may have tolerated their unscrupulous activities
in the past, it will not be hospitable to such activities in the future. The
company's collaboration with law enforcement makes a statement to
the outside world as well, effectively declaring that, when wrongdoing is
found in its midst, the company will do the right thing by ousting those
responsible and seeing to it that they are brought to justice.11 3 Certainly,
a business environment in which companies consistently make clear that
criminal behavior is unacceptable is in the public's best interest.
c. Emphasis on Cooperation Is Not an Anomaly Found Within White Collar
or Corporate Prosecution
Some of the complaints about the Department's emphasis on
corporate cooperation make it sound like the technique of "squeez-
ing" or "coercing" cooperation from a putative defendant is unique to
the white collar setting.114 This cannot be farther from the truth: "Ju-
dicial leniency for cooperators traces its roots back hundreds of years
to the common law practice of approvement, and American prosecu-
tors have been striking deals with cooperators at least since the nine-
teenth century."115 In more recent times, the U.S. Sentencing Guide-
lines have made defendants' cooperation and declarations of remorse
centerpieces of the federal sentencing regime. A defendant can earn
a reduction in base offense level points for accepting responsibility for
her criminal conduct,11 6 and she can obtain a downward departure
from a guideline sentence if the government files a motion stating
that she provided "substantial assistance in the investigation or prose-
112 See Michael A. Simons, Retribution for Rats: Cooperation, Punishment, and Atonement, 56
VAND. L. REv. 1, 29 (2003) (-he common contempt for rats carries significant practical
consequences for the cooperator. Most obviously, the cooperator is ostracized from his
criminal cohorts.").
113 Cf Simons, supra note 13, at 994-95 ("From the prosecutor's perspective, a corpo-
ration's cooperation (or lack of cooperation) becomes a proxy for the corporation's char-
acter-a window, if you will, into the corporation's soul.").
114 Davies & Scannell, supra note 12 ("Prosecutors continue to use the threat of in-
dictment to force companies to cooperate with investigators...
115 Simons, supra note 13, at 979.
16 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3El.1 (2003).
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cution of another person."1 7 Congress specifically blessed downward
departures for cooperation in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e), whereby it author-
ized courts to impose a sentence below a statutory minimum upon
government motion and a judicial finding of substantial assistance.118
Is the process of convincing a putative defendant to cooperate
against others coercive? Of course it is. To facilitate cooperation, an
individual defendant must waive his Fifth Amendment right against
self-incrimination, along with his Seventh Amendment right to trial by
jury, in addition to his right to appeal a guilty verdict." 9 Also, going
through the ordeal of admitting guilt, being debriefed, and possibly
testifying against confederates in court is extremely unpleasant. Yet,
many putative defendants choose to cooperate despite the cost because
they judge that the benefit-a reduction in sentence-is worth the
price. Their Hobson's choice is not caused by an unfair or overbearing
government. Rather, it is the direct result of their prior criminal con-
duct.120 The same is true for a company faced with having to choose
between cooperating to minimize the damage done by corporate
wrongdoing on the one hand, and fighting the charges on the other.
II. IMPLICATING THE ATtORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
A. Protected Corporate Matters
When an individual person decides to cooperate with prosecu-
tors, his decision usually has no bearing on the attorney-client privi-
lege. To effectuate his cooperation, the individual must tell all he
knows about the criminal activity in question, and although this will
involve repeating to the prosecutor the facts he shared earlier with his
attorney, the facts themselves are not protected by the attorney-client
117 Id. § 5Kl.1.
I1s 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(e) (West 2003).
119 See Richter, supra note 41, at 30 ("[Flederal and state prosecutors routinely insist
that individual defendants waive important rights such as the Fifth Amendment right
against self-incrimination, the Seventh Amendment right to a trial by jury, and the right to
appeal a conviction and sentence in exchange for favorable treatment.").
120 See id. at 28 ("Targets are often asked to come clean and reveal the details of their
[sic] crime in exchange for more lenient treatment. No one would argue that it is inap-
propriate to ask an individual to waive his Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination and share all pertinent information about a crime in order to obtain a re-
duced charge or lighter sentence.").
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privilege.121 In other words, the defendant does not say to prosecu-
tors, "I told my attorney I did X, and my attorney responded Y" In-
stead, he simply relates to the prosecutors, "I did X," which happens
to correspond with what he told counsel when seeking legal advice.
The facts are not privileged. 22 Likewise, documents created outside of
the attorney-client relationship, which are later shown to the attorney
to facilitate the giving and receiving of legal advice, are not attorney-
client protected. 123 It is easy to see why the latter is so. If documents
presented to an attorney became privileged, every putative defendant
would gather up all relevant documents at his disposal and dump
them on the nearest attorney's desk. When an individual shares
documents with the government after deciding to cooperate there-
fore, the privilege is simply not implicated.
The same could be true for corporations. As noted above, upon
learning about potential criminal conduct by corporate employees,
corporations typically launch an internal investigation. 24 This is the
only way the corporation can figure out "what happened." The corpo-
ration needs to know this for a variety of reasons: to avoid or reduce
liability to the victims of the alleged illegality (be they creditors, con-
sumers, or shareholders); to avoid or reduce liability in the administra-
tive context (such as during an enforcement proceeding by the SEC);
to avoid or reduce corporate criminal liability; and, hopefully, to do the
right thing by halting any criminal activity. 125 If the corporate officer
121 See id. at 29 ("It is true that privilege waivers as a component of cooperation are
unique to corporate defendants .... Rarely, if ever, would an individual target need to
refer to any privileged information in order to come clean. . .
122 Seu id.
123 Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 392 (1976).
124 See supra notes 104-106 and accompanying text.
125 See Duggin, supra note 8, at 884. As Sarah Helene Duggin explains:
The rapid rise in the incidence of criminal prosecution of major corpora-
tions, the implementation of the USSC's Organizational Sentencing Guidelines,
the expanding bases of corporate civil liability, and the current national focus
on curbing "corporate greed" have created compelling incentives for organi-
zations to act promptly to discover and correct acts and omissions that pose
significant liability risks. The internal investigation is the tool that permits
them to do so. The circumstances that prompt internal investigations are
myriad: evidence of irregular stock trades, allegations of illegal employment
discrimination, the results of an internal audit, an anonymous tip about bill-
ing irregularities, a civil suit, the sudden departure of a key employee, an in-
quiry or site inspection by regulatory agency personnel, a customer com-
plaint, a civil investigative demand, a grand jury subpoena, or any of a vast
assortment of other reasons.
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initiating the investigation were exclusively to use nonlawyers, such as
forensic accountants, as investigators, the results of the investigation-
witness statements, notes of the investigators, the final report-would
not be attorney-client protected. Nor would they be protected by any
other privilege. 126 If the government later undertook an investigation,
these materials would have to be turned over pursuant to subpoena or
other appropriate process.
Of course, corporations typically choose to employ counsel, either
in-house, outside, or both, to conduct their internal investigations. 127
This practice is eminently rational. As experts in the legal and regula-
tory landscape, lawyers are in the best position to advise the corpora-
tion on whether a crime has been committed and, if so, what course of
action it should take. Moreover, when lawyers conduct an investigation,
the resultant materials gain protection under the attorney-client privi-
lege. This gives the corporation the ability to control whether it will re-
veal such materials to outsiders at a later time through privilege
waiver.128
Corporations generate other attorney-client protected material as
well. This occurs when ideas or proposals are "run by" counsel to de-
termine whether (or how) they can be done legally.12 It also occurs
when counsel functions in a general compliance capacity, either
through structured compliance programs or on a more informal, ad
hoc basis.'30 The privilege does not apply, however, when counsel ren-
ders business, as opposed to legal, advice.' 3'
126 The Supreme Court has held that there is no such thing as accountant-client privi-
lege under federal common law. Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 335 (1973).
127 See Alec Joch, Note, Internal Corporate Investigations: The Waiver of Attorney-Client Privi-
lege and Work-Product Protection Through Voluntary Disclosures to the Government, 34 AM. CRIM.
L. REv. 347, 348-49 (1997) (describing how corporate self-investigation by outside or in-
house counsel is the norm).
128 Duggin, supra note 8, at 889 (discussing why corporations usually have counsel con-
duct internal investigations).
12 See Zornow & Krakaur, supra note 104, at 150 ("The attorney-client privilege ... fa-
cilitate [s] the participation of attorneys in our legal system in the role of confidential legal
advisors .... Specifically, clients may obtain guidance about the legality of past and prospec-
tive behavior .... ") (emphasis added).
130 See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 392 (1981) (privilege enables attor-
neys to "ensure their client's compliance with the law").
131 See Lonnie T. Brown, Jr., Reconsidering the Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege: A Response
to the Compelled-Voluntary Waiver Paradox, 34 Hos'rstA L. REv. 897, 909 (2006).
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B. Privilege Waiver
Most corporate misconduct initially comes to the attention of the
administrative agency that has jurisdiction over relevant matters.132 The
information may come from the corporation's own self-reporting, from a
whistleblower, or as a result of the agency's routine compliance mecha-
nisms.133 Depending upon the nature and seriousness of the allega-
tions, the agency may decide to handle the matter purely administra-
tively or to make a referral to DOJ or the appropriate law enforcement
agency for criminal investigation. 134 Due to the nature of white collar
investigations, the corporation is likely to learn of a criminal investiga-
tion long before any charges are brought. Most often, this is because
the corporation is served with grand jury subpoenas or informal re-
quests for documents and information during the investigatory phase
of the case.135
For all of the reasons set out above, a rational prosecutor will
seek the corporation's cooperation in the investigation at the earliest
possible stage.136 Cooperation will enable the prosecutor to shortcut
what would otherwise be a long and difficult process of information
gathering-figuring out who is who, who did what, and what evidence
there is to prove it. A prosecutor who ignores this reality would be
derelict in duty.
If the corporation chooses to cooperate, much of the assistance it
can offer will have no bearing on its attorney-client privilege. For ex-
ample, the corporation can provide access to nonprivileged computer
files and documents; including organizational charts, books and ledg-
ers; policy manuals; and internal (nonlegal) memoranda. 37 It can
also make available for interviews and testimony officers and employ-
ees who are willing to speak.' 38 Corporate officers or counsel can ex-
plain to prosecutors how pieces of the puzzle fit together to form a
coherent picture of the activity in question. i3 9
132 See Michael L. Seigel & Christopher Slobogin, Prosecuting Martha: Federal Prosecuto-
rial Power and the Need for a Law of Counts, 109 PENN. ST. L. REv. 1107, 1109 (2005) ("Most
of the time, white-collar investigations are initiated, not by members of the Department of
Justice, but by employees of regulatory agencies such as the SEC, IRS, or EPA.").
133 See id.
134 Id. at 1109-10.
135 See ISRAEL ET AL., supra note 73, at 330-34 (describing investigative use of grand
jury).
136 See infra notes 104-109 and accompanying text.
137 See Duggin, supra note 8, at 896-97.
138 See id. at 907-09.
139 See id. at 864.
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Sometimes, this degree of cooperation will be sufficient for prose-
cutors to decide either that no crimes took place or that certain of the
corporation's employees merit indictment. 140 It will also be a factor in
determining whether, if criminality existed, the corporation should be
charged separately as a legal entity. If cooperation short of waiver is suf-
ficient, the case can be concluded without any impact on the corpora-
tion's attorney-client privilege. As the McNulty Memorandum indicates,
this manner of resolution should be the prosecution's goal.1 41
On other occasions, however, this level of corporate cooperation
will be of more limited use. For example, the relevant corporate docu-
ments may have been devised at the request of in-house counsel acting
as legal compliance officer. Such documents would thus be privileged
and could not be shared with prosecutors absent privilege waiver. Al-
ternatively, the corporation might have severed its relationship with the
main culprits of the criminal activity, meaning that it would have no
leverage to encourage them to provide statements or testimony. At the
same time, however, the corporation may have in its possession the re-
sults of the internal investigation, conducted by counsel, which led it to
fire the culprits and take other remedial action. As noted above, such
materials would be protected by the privilege. 142
Even in cases of this latter kind, it is still possible that the corpora-
tion could provide substantial assistance to prosecutors without privi-
lege waiver. If the case is small and the criminality focused, the corpora-
tion's sharing of nonprivileged information, combined with the federal
government's ability to probe through its use of the grand jury and
other investigatory techniques, may enable prosecutors to track down
the responsible individuals in a fast and efficient manner. By requiring
prosecutors to justify to their superiors why privilege waiver in any given
situation is necessary, presumably the McNulty Memorandum protects
the privilege in cases of this small, focused variety as well. 143
Some white collar investigations, however, will involve criminality
that spans years, implicates multiple individuals, and bleeds across a
seemingly infinite array of documents. 144 Worse yet for prosecutors,
140 See Mary Beth Buchanan, Effective Cooperation by Business Organizations and the Impact
of Privilege Waivers, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 587, 604 (2004) (noting that often cooperation
short of waiver can be sufficient).
141 McNulty Memorandum, supra note 36, at 8-9. The memorandum could be clearer,
however, in stating that privilege waiver should be sought only as a last resort.
142 See supra notes 127-128 and accompanying text.
143 See McNulty Memorandum, supra note 36, at 8-9.
144 See supra notes 61-67 and accompanying text.
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cases of this magnitude often involve extremely sophisticated schemes
that are difficult for an outsider to understand, let alone unravel. In
such cases, a corporation might point prosecutors in the right direction
without waiving privilege, but this would be of only limited assistance.
The investigation would still take years to run its course as prosecutors
struggled to subpoena and interpret the right documents, immunize
and debrief the correct witnesses, figure out whether a crime had been
committed, and, if so, whether there was sufficient proof to bring
charges. Only if the corporation short-circuited these extensive prose-
cutorial efforts by waiving privilege and sharing internal reports,
documents, and witness statements that laid out the crime and the
conduct of those responsible could it fairly claim to have rendered sub-
stantial assistance to the prosecution. 145
Having set forth the benefit of privilege waiver in the right con-
text, this Article turns to an examination of the many arguments prof-
fered against it.146
III. ARGUMENTS AGAINST PRIVILEGE WAIVER
A. The Attorney-Client Privilege Is Sacrosanct
Oft repeated in the debate over privilege waiver are statements
hailing the attorney-client privilege as a time-honored and fundamental
feature of any fair system of justice. 147 The implication flowing from this
claim is that any intrusion on the privilege, such as permitting the gov-
ernment to "coerce" corporations into waiving it, is inherently a bad
thing.
Although many who wax poetic about the foundational nature of
the attorney-client privilege would be surprised to learn about its rela-
145 See Buchanan, supra note 140, at 604-05 (stating that privilege waiver enables a
corporation to assist the government in cases where the corporation has a complicated
organizational structure, sophisticated document management and computer systems,
idiosyncratic policies and procedures, and diffused knowledge of the pertinent events).
146 See infra notes 147-232 and accompanying text.
147 See, e.g., Am. Coll. of Trial Lawyers, The Erosion of the Attorney-Client Privilege and Wor*-
Product Doctrine in Federal Criminal Investigations, 41 Duq. L. REv. 307, 319, 350 (2003);
Brown supra note 131, at 912, 917-18 (noting the "sacrosanct aura" of the privilege and
the "air of sacredness that ... envelops it"); Richter, supra note 41, at 13 ("[C]ritics ...
argue that government requests for waiver ... represent an inappropriate intrusion into
the sanctity of the time-honored lawyer-client relationship that is inherently unfair.");
Robert A. Del Giorno, Corporate Counsel as Government's Agent: The Holder Memorandum and
Sarbanes-Oxley Section 307, CHAMPION, Aug. 2003, at 22; cf Buchanan, supra note 140, at 595
(noting that critics frequently raise the argument that "the government's evaluation of
cooperation violates the sanctity of the attorney-client privilege").
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tively humble beginnings, 148 there can be little doubt that, today, it is a
centerpiece of our legal system.149 This, however, is not because of a
deontological notion that the privilege is fundamentally right, fair, or
good, a conclusion that would inevitably lead to the position that it
should remain inviolate regardless -of consequences. Rather, the at-
torney-client privilege is defensible only on utilitarian grounds, that is,
because it results in more good for society than bad.150 Because the
justification for the privilege is utilitarian, reciting homilies in support
of it cannot assist in determining whether it should be enforced in
any particular setting; rather, a cost-benefit analysis must be em-
ployed. Only if the benefits of protecting attorney-client confidences
outweigh the costs should the privilege be protected.
There is nothing earth-shattering about this revelation. The cost
of enforcing the attorney-client privilege has long been recognized: in
any given matter, the privilege interferes with ascertainment of the
truth. Not surprisingly, then, black letter law surrounding the privi-
lege makes clear that enforcement is the exception, not the rule:
"For more than three centuries it has now been recognized as
a fundamental maxim that the public (in the words sanctioned
by Lord Hardwicke) has a right to every man's evidence. When
we come to examine the various claims of exemption, we start
with the primary assumption that there is a general duty to
give what testimony one is capable of giving, and that any ex-
emptions which may exist are distinctly exceptional, being so
many derogations from a positive general rule."151
148 See Brown, supra note 131, at 912-18 (recounting that the privilege began in Eng-
land as a "by-product of British etiquette": lawyers were "reluctant to breach the code of a
gentleman by being compelled to reveal in court what they had been told by their cli-
ents").
149 Not everyone believes that the attorney-client privilege, at least in the corporate
context, serves any useful purpose at all. Professor Elizabeth Thornburg has advocated its
wholesale abrogation. See generally Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Sanctifying Secrecy: The Mythology
of the Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 157 (1993). This Article does
not adhere to this extreme position.
150 For a brief discussion of the utilitarian arguments in favor of attorney-client privi-
lege, see Lawton P. Cummings, The Ethical Minefield: Corporate Internal Investigations and
Individual Assertions of the Attorney-Client Pivilege, 109 W. VA. L. REv. 669, 672-73 (2007).
151 United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950) (quoting 8J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
§ 2192 (3d ed. 1940)); see In re GrandJury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d 910, 915 (8th
Cir. 1997) (holding that government official is not entitled to attorney-client privilege
when consulting with government counsel).
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The cost associated with the privilege is present in the corporate arena:
an assertion of corporate privilege deprives prosecutors, and thus the
public, of the true facts surrounding alleged corporate criminality.
Thus, those arguing that DOJ should not be able to request privilege
waivers, or give cooperation credit to companies that waive privilege,
have the burden of explaining why such an extraordinary position is
necessary to further an even greater public good.
Consistent with this understanding of the privilege, it is useful to
note that the ABA's own Model Rules of Professional Conduct recog-
nize that client confidentiality, and consequently the attorney-client
privilege, must sometimes yield to other more important considera-
tions. 152 The most widely cited of these exceptions allows an attorney to
reveal a confidence to prevent future death or serious bodily harm. 153 A
relatively new exception permits disclosure "to prevent the client from
committing a crime or fraud that is reasonably certain to result in sub-
stantial injury to the financial interests or property of another and in
furtherance of which the client has used or is using the lawyer's ser-
vices."154 One other long-standing exception is especially interesting. It
permits an attorney to breach confidence if necessary:
to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a
controversy between the lawyer and the client, to establish a
defense to a criminal charge or civil claim against the lawyer
based upon conduct in which the client was involved, or to re-
spond to allegations in any proceeding concerning the law-
yer's representation of the client.155
In other words, this exception allows an attorney to breach a client's
confidence whenever it is in the attorney's best interest to do so-
even when the attack on the attorney comes from a source other than
the client personally.156 Looking at this last exception, the ABA's out-
rage at the practice of privilege waiver seems precariously close to
hypocritical. 157
152 See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b) (2003).
153 Id. R. 1.6(b) (1).
154 Id. R. 1.6(b) (2).
155 Id. R. 1.6(b)(5).
156 See id.
157 See Michael Seigel, Use of Privileged Information for Attorney Self-Interest: A Moral Di-
lemma, 3 Bus. & PROF. ETHics J. 1, 1 (1983) (arguing that exceptions to attorney-client
privilege for attorneys themselves and not for others similarly situated violate Kant's cate-
gorical imperative).
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B. Privilege Waiver Does More Harm Than Good
Critics of privilege waiver do not stop at deontological argument.
They proceed to make the utilitarian case that widespread privilege
waiver (1) deters corporate insiders from running ideas by corporate
counsel;158 (2) deters corporations from instituting serious compliance
programs;159 (3) deters corporations from conducting internal investi-
gations; 160 and (4) deters corporate employees from being forthcoming
with counsel during the course of internal investigations. 161 As a result,
they say, privilege waiver impedes the ability of corporations to police
themselves and, therefore, will result in more criminality, not less.162
For the most part, these are very serious contentions that require care-
ful analysis. 163
158 See George Ellard, Making the Silent Speak and the Informed Wary, 42 AM. CRIM. L.
REv. 985, 992-93 (2005) ("[T]he attorney-client privilege is often justified as a means to
encourage employees to be forthcoming with counsel so that legal advice can be based on
all relevant knowledge ... the Thompson Memorandum gives company personnel an in-
centive not to speak to internal counsel."); Susan Hackett, Wither Attorney Client Privilege? 8
ACC DOCKET 132, 139 (2005) ("Without privilege, employees may decide it is better to
keep their worries to themselves, rather than provide potentially damaging information to
lawyers which could come back to haunt them."); Peloso & Brooks, supra note 25, at 630
("[W]ithout these protections, corporate officers and directors will be less likely to seek
legal advice from corporate counsel."); infra notes 164-166 and accompanying text.
159 See infta notes 167-174 and accompanying text.
160 See infra notes 175-192 and accompanying text.
161 See infta notes 193-212 and accompanying text.
162 See Ellard, supra note 158, at 992-93; Hackett, supra note 158, at 139.
163 Some instrumental arguments against waiver do not merit a serious response. For
example, Professor Lisa Griffin contends that deputizing corporate insiders may cause
officers and board members to "engage in additional wrongdoing to avoid detection and
exposure to liability .... They may respond to the pressures of investigations with still
more creative accounting." Griffm, supra note 61, at 334. Professor Griffin does not ex-
plain why the reaction of corporate officers would be any different if government officials
were doing the investigating instead of corporate insiders. Yet, she can not possibly be
suggesting that society would be better off if criminal activity went uninvestigated on the
theory that this would prevent crime.
The arguments made by ProfessorJohn S. Baker are even more outlandish. He claims
that "using criminal law to bring about moral reform or rehabilitation among individuals
has been a failure" and argues that there is "absolutely no basis at all for attempting to
achieve moral reform or rehabilitation of a corporation" because it has "'no soul to
danm.'"John S. Baker, Reforming Corporations Through Threats of Federal Prosecution, 89 COR-
NELL L. lEv. 310, 322 (2004). In fact, because corporations have the ability to divest them-
selves of wrongdoers, it is more likely that criminal prosecution will lead to their reforma-
tion than in the case of individuals, not less. Professor Baker also contends that the federal
government's use of the criminal law to encourage good corporate citizenship is an in-
fringement of state's rights, id. at 311-12, an unjustified intrusion into the private sector,
id at 313-15, a potentially unconstitutional practice, id. at 323, and just bad policy, id. at
337-53. His final proscription-that the Justice Department should leave corporations
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1. Waiver Discourages Insiders from Conducting Routine Consultations
with Corporate Counsel
The first argument, that waiver causes company officials to forgo
routine interactions with in-house counsel, 164 is not terribly credible.
Corporate officers run ideas by counsel before they have been con-
verted into policies or plans and put into place. In seeking out legal
advice at this stage, the corporate officer has nothing to hide because
nothing has been done yet. It is in the officer's interests to disclose all
aspects of the plan to counsel and to receive help in discerning how it
can be implemented in a legal manner. Because the communication
between management and counsel does not implicate criminality of
any kind, it will take place regardless of its status under the attorney-
client privilege. Of course, the officer might lie to counsel because
she is planning to commit a crime, or she might not follow counsel's
advice and decide to engage in criminal activity after the fact. In the
former instance, the conversation would not be privileged because it
would fall under the crime-fraud exception. 165 In the latter case, pro-
tecting the conversation against disclosure (should the corporation
choose to waive) seems contrary to the goal of the privilege, which is
to encourage individuals to seek legal advice in order to follow it.166
2. Waiver Discourages Compliance Programs
The second rationale against privilege waiver-that it will dis-
courage compliance programs167 -is only slightly more serious. For
most corporations, not having a strong compliance department is
simply not an option. Compliance programs are essential for coping
alone and begin policing itself, see id. at 353-55-is evidence of his extreme ideological
bias: even assuming that government reform is needed, what does that have to do with the
pros and cons of prosecuting white collar crime? These additional contentions merit no
response.
1'A See Griffin, supra note 61, at 348 (arguing that with waiver looming in the back-
ground, corporations cannot seek advice 'that suggests even a hypothetical consideration
of fraudulent conduct").
166 See In re Impounded Case (Law Firm), 879 F.2d 1211, 1213 (3d Cir. 1989).
166 See H. Lowell Brown, The Crime-Fraud Exception to the Attorney-Client Privilege in the
Context of Corporate Counseling, 87 Ky. LJ. 1191, 1218 (1999) ("Indeed, it is to prevent abuse
of the secrecy accorded bona fide attorney-client communications that the modern crime-
fraud exception has been fashioned.").
167 See Griffin, supra note 61, at 335 ("[D]eputizing corporate insiders to perform
prosecutorial functions makes it difficult for employees to consult in good faith with coun-
sel about compliance . .. ."); Hackett, supra note 158, at 141 (arguing that incursions into
the attorney-client privilege are undermining future compliance efforts).
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with the vast regulatory landscape found in today's world. For exam-
ple, a healthcare provider must ensure that it is complying with the
horrifically complicated Medicare, Medicaid, and other health insur-
ance rules. 168 Likewise, cruise ship 169 and waste disposal companies 170
need to be extremely sensitive to regulations issued by the Environ-
mental Protection Agency. All companies, especially publicly traded
ones, must be on a consistent vigil to ensure observance of all SEC
rules and regulations. 171 Failure to be in regulatory compliance can
subject a company to a wide variety of administrative penalties, includ-
ing debarment from participation in government programs-which
can be the death knell of a company that depends on government
contracts or reimbursement for the majority of its income.172 Disobe-
dience can also lead to expensive shareholder derivative suits and law-
suits from third parties claiming harm.173 Finally, shutting down com-
pliance programs to avoid generating materials that might later be
used against the company or its officials in a criminal case is ex-
tremely short-sighted: under the McNulty Memorandum, one of the
factors a prosecutor must take into account when deciding whether to
indict a corporation is the strength of these very same programs. 174
3. Waiver Discourages Internal Investigations
The third argument against privilege waiver is that it will discour-
age companies suspecting internal criminality from conducting an
investigation because the materials generated by the investigation may
be used against the company and its employees in a future criminal
168 See U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Servs., Regulations and Guidance, http://
www.cms.hhs.gov/home/regsguidance.asp (last visited Oct. 12, 2007).
169 See Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Royal Caribbean to Pay Record $18 Million
Criminal Fine for Dumping Oil and Hazardous Chemicals, Making False Statements (July
21, 1999), http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/1999/July/316enr.htm.
170 See United States v. MacDonald & Watson Waste Oil Co., 933 F.2d 35, 61 (1st Cir.
1991) (upholding defendants' convictions for improperly disposing of hazardous waste).
171 See generally Seigel, supra note 65 (explaining SEC's administrative enforcement of
securities laws and regulations).
172 See Carole Basri, Why Implement an Effective Corporate Compliance Program?, in CORPO-
RATE COMPLIANCE INSTITUTE 2006, at 809 (PLI Corp. Law and Practice Course Handbook
Series No. 8917, 2006), WL 1536 PLI/Corp 805 (listing nine companies forced to make
"large settlements with the government" of over a million dollars each because they lacked
an "effective compliance program"); U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Suspension and Debarment
Program, http://epa.gov/ogd/sdd/debarment.htm (last visited Oct. 5, 2007).
173 Steven M. Kowell, 53 FooD & DRUG L.J. 517, 522 (1998) ("Perhaps most impor-
tantly, a compliance program may be necessary to comply with a director's duty of care
and to avoid director liability in shareholder derivative suits.").
174 McNulty Memorandum, supra note 36, at 4.
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case. 175 The proponents of this argument contend that, as a result,
illegal conduct will be ignored or undiscovered for long periods of
time, causing more harm to society than if corporate privilege were
treated as sacrosanct. 176 Though not completely without merit, this
contention cannot survive careful scrutiny.
As an initial matter, all of the reasons why corporations will con-
tinue to have strong compliance programs in place despite privilege
waiver apply here as well. A corporation that suspects criminality in its
midst simply cannot afford to ignore it: the risks of regulatory and
third-party liability are too high. 77 There is, however, an even stronger
reason for high-level corporate officials to investigate allegations of
criminal activity amongst their subordinates: if they don't, and the gov-
ernment initiates a criminal investigation at a later date, the acquies-
cence of the officials in the criminal activity could subject them to per-
sonal criminal liability.178 One would think that the consequence of
facing time in prison provides a strong incentive to act.
Proponents of the argument that waiver discourages internal in-
vestigations provide no empirical evidence to support it. 79 The avail-
able evidence, moreover, tends to refute it.' 8° This evidence is the very
increase in deferred prosecutions based upon corporate cooperation
and waiver of privilege that has taken place-and so outraged oppo-
nents of it-in recent years.' 8' If corporations were not continuing to
conduct internal investigations, one would expect to see a decrease in
the number of privilege waivers, as fewer corporations would have
anything useful to turn over to prosecutors through this technique.
This does not appear to be the case.182
This is not to say that the possibility that their company may waive
privilege in the future has no impact on the manner in which counsel
175 See Wray & Hur, supra note 20, at 1174 (stating that critics contend that "companies
may balk at conducting otherwise warranted internal investigations for fear of the implica-
tions of waiver"); see also Brown, supra note 131, at 901 (same).
176 See Brown, supra note 131, at 901-05 (discussing alleged consequences from com-
panies' decision to forgo internal investigations).
177 See supra notes 167-174 and accompanying text.
178 See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 925 F.2d 1182, 1191 (9th Cir. 1998) (upholding
conviction of superior for knowing about and consenting to criminal activity of subordi-
nates); United States v. Misle Bus & Equip. Co., 967 F.2d 1227, 1232 (8th Cir. 1992) (up-
holding defendant's conspiracy conviction based on his being aware of the existence of the
conspiracy and failing to stop it).
179 See Wray & Hur, supra note 20, at 1176.
180 Griffin, supra note 61, at 345-47.
181 See id.
18 See id.
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conduct internal investigations. Anecdotal evidence suggests that at-
torneys take steps to minimize the written record connected to an in-
ternal investigation so as to limit the materials subject to disclosure to
government investigators at a later date.183 These steps include not
finalizing witness statements and reporting orally to senior manage-
ment in lieu of writing a final investigative report.1 84
There is undoubtedly a cost associated with these practices, namely,
less efficient and exacting internal investigations. By not pinning wit-
nesses down, forgoing the process of having them review and sign writ-
ten statements, and not giving management the opportunity to study a
final written report before determining what action to take, the prob-
ability that the corporation will be able to uncover the full scope of the
criminal activity and hold all culpable individuals accountable is slightly
diminished.18 This cost, however, is probably small; a firm's manage-
ment and its attorneys are likely to be quite deft at handing most inter-
nal situations. Further, these practices do little to impede the effective-
ness of corporate cooperation with the government later on. If a
corporation decides to waive, attorneys' notes (especially notes of in-
terviews) can be provided to prosecutors, along with an explanation of
the significance of the corporation's actions. This is nearly as good as a
more complete written record.
In any event, this barn door was opened a long time ago, and
closing it now by restricting privilege waiver would serve no purpose.
In the 1981 case of Upjohn Co. v. United States,186 the U.S. Supreme
Court held that corporate communications are protected by the at-
torney-client privilege regardless of the level or title of the employee
18 See, e.g., Richard Ben-Veniste & Lee H. Rubin, DOJ Reaffirms and Expands Aggressive
Corporate Cooperation Guidelines, LEGAL BACKGROUNDER, Apr. 4, 2003, at 1, 2, available at
http://www.mayerbrown.com/news/article.asp?id=702&nid=5 ('[T]he prospects of a
company waiver may ... creat[e] disincentives to formalize thoughts or convey impres-
sions in writing ... ."); Peloso & Brooks, supra note 25, at 630 ('[A]ttorneys conducting
internal investigations may become less effective because they may be reluctant to docu-
ment their work-product for fear that any documentation will have to be produced to the
government.").
184 See, e.g., Ben-Veniste & Rubin, supra note 183, at 2; Peloso & Brooks, supra note 25,
at 630.
188 Professor Brown argues that "a lawyer's ethical duty of competency combined with
a fear of malpractice liability or the possibility that some other civil or criminal action will
be instituted against him or her seem to provide ample motivation for careful documenta-
tion and record-keeping." Brown, supra note 131, at 942. This view might be overly opti-
mistic, however, because an attorney is likely to be able to argue successfully in these ven-
ues that balancing the goals of investigating thoroughly against minimizing a harmful
record met the standard of practice in the field.
188 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
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who consulted with corporate counsel, so long as certain conditions
are met.187 The Court made clear, however, that the privilege belongs
to the corporation as an entity, not to any of its agents.18 Thus, when
officers and employees reveal confidences to corporate counsel for
the purpose of facilitating counsel's provision of legal advice to the
corporation, these confidences are protected only as long as, and to
the extent that, the corporation wishes to invoke the privilege.1 9 If
corporate agents with the appropriate authority choose to waive the
privilege at a later date, there is nothing that the confidence-revealing
agents or employees can do to prevent disclosure. 90 Control of the
privilege rests with the corporation. 191
When corporate counsel minimize the records generated by an
internal investigation, they are not really reacting to DOJ's increasing
reliance in recent years on privilege waivers; rather, their actions are
consistent with the legal landscape created by Upjohn in 1981.192 Law-
yers are trained to consider and prepare for the worst-case scenario;
they must therefore assume that the government (or some private
party) will come knocking at the door at a later date seeking disclo-
sure of protected materials. Whether or not this actually happens is
effectively beside the point. If DOJ announced tomorrow that it would
never seek privilege waiver again, or if legislation were passed forcing
it to adopt this position, the risk that the corporation might voluntarily
waive privilege in any number of future circumstances would con-
tinue, as long as Upjohn remained good law. Thus, lawyers would per-
sist in taking steps to minimize the creation of materials subject to
later disclosure. Critics of DOJ's increasing reliance on privilege waiv-
ers have missed this fundamental point.
4. Waiver Discourages Employee Cooperation with Internal
Investigations
The most troubling arguments against privilege waiver stem from
the impact it is said to have on the behavior of corporate employees
who face questioning during an internal investigation into criminal ac-
tivity, and the lack of fairness that the prospect of waiver creates with
187 See id. at 395-97.
188 See id. at 389-92.
189 See id.
190 See id.
191 See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389-92.
192 See Brown, supra note 131, at 903-04 (questioning how forthcoming corporate em-
ployees are with counsel in light of Upjohn).
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respect to these individuals.193 These arguments merit careful consid-
eration.
An internal investigation often begins with a freeze on access to
computer and paper files so that the relevant evidence is not subject
to tampering. Once this is accomplished, counsel examines the re-
cords at issue. 194 The next logical step-and probably the most impor-
tant-is the interviewing of prospective witnesses. 195 Most of these
witnesses will be employees of the organization. Typically, cooperation
with such investigations will be an implicit or explicit requirement of
the employee's job. Nothing in the law stops a company from taking
action against a recalcitrant employee. Refusal to cooperate with the
investigation, therefore, could result in sanctioning by the corpora-
tion, up to and including termination.196
The main reason that an employee would refuse to cooperate un-
der threat of sanction is fear of self-incrimination. The employee might
be worried about the prospect of suffering even worse employer sanc-
tions upon discovery of the underlying conduct, or she might be fearful
that her words will be used against her in a later criminal proceeding,
or both. A potentially guilty employee thus faces a dismal set of options:
(1) silence, and likely termination; (2) cooperation, and likely sanc-
tions; and (3) lying, perhaps avoiding liability in the short term, but
running the risk of worse consequences in the future.
Caught in this trilemma, the employee needs legal advice. If she
is a high-level officer, she is probably aware of the implications of Up-
john and will seek advice from a private attorney. If she is relatively un-
sophisticated, however, she might believe that, in speaking to corpo-
rate counsel, her confidences will be kept and her personal situation
addressed. 197 This, of course, is not the case, and if the employee is
not made aware of this fact, she has not been treated fairly by the cor-
poration and its attorney. Once again, the situation the employee
finds herself in is not dictated by the possibility that DOJ might make
a future request for privilege waiver. Rather, it rests on the mere abil-
193 See id. at 937-41 (discussing problem of lack of candor); Griffin, supra note 61, at
335-36.
194 See Duggin, supra note 8, at 888-91 ("Most commentators agree that it is usually
best to begin with obtaining and reviewing relevant documents. It is clear that immediate
steps should be taken to prevent the destruction of any possibly relevant documents, as
well as email messages, video and audio recordings, or any of a host of other potentially
related materials.").
195 See id. at 891-92.
196 See id. at 907.
197 See id. at 910 (noting that the employee might not realize his vulnerable situation).
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ity of the corporation, post-Upjohn, to waive privilege voluntarily in any
situation it sees fit. Upjohn puts the employee at risk.' 98
Moreover, the employee's trilemma is of her own making; that is, it
is a result of her apparent participation in criminal activity. If she suf-
fers consequences as a result of this behavior-be it termination from
employment or a criminal conviction-she is not a candidate for a
whole lot of sympathy. 99 Nevertheless, the employee should have the
opportunity to consult with counsel, in an absolutely privileged context,
prior to making any decisions about her reaction to the corporation's
internal investigation. It might turn out, for example, that-despite her
own fears and beliefs-she is not criminally liable, which counsel can
tell her and which would change the range of her options dramatically.
Alternatively, if her role is minimal and she can help point the finger at
others, it may be that her best option is complete cooperation with the
investigation. She might even benefit from being the first one to knock
on the prosecutor's door. Yet another strategy would be for her to re-
main silent, face the consequences for failing to cooperate, and take
her chances vis-a-vis a future criminal prosecution.
To the extent that the law and legal practice is lacking here, the
culprit is not DOJ waiver policy. Instead, it is with the rules regarding
when and how corporate counsel must advise an employee that coun-
sel does not represent her. ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct
1.13(f) states:
In dealing with an organization's directors, officers, employ-
ees, members, shareholders or other constituents, a lawyer
shall explain the identity of the client when the lawyer knows
or reasonably should know that the organization's interests
are adverse to those of the constituents with whom the lawyer
is dealing. 2°°
198 See Brown, supra note 131, at 937-38 ("Ironically, the most significant of these per-
ceived side effects-reduced candor between counsel and corporate employees-already
exists under the current formulation of the federal privilege, even absent the specter of
government-coerced waiver."); Richter, supra note 41, at 32 (noting that concerns over the
willingness of corporate employees to cooperate with internal investigations can be traced
to Upjohn, not privilege waiver).
199 Of course, not everyone agrees with this statement. See Duggin, supra note 8, at 914
("While few would suggest that protection of 'culpable' employees is appropriate, punish-
ment or termination of an employee simply because a third party-whether a co-worker,
prosecutor or agency-views that person as 'culpable' is difficult to square with basic no-
tions of fairness").
200 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13 (2003).
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For two distinct reasons, this rule is very weak. First, it is triggered
only when a lawyer has reason to believe that the interests of the "con-
stituent[]," in this case, the employee, are adverse to those of the or-
ganization. 01 This is likely true any time the employee has personal
liability for criminal conduct. However, the attorney may not have rea-
son to know about the employee's criminal liability until she has made
a disclosure-which is too late for her, because the disclosure is not
protected. Second, the lawyer's responsibility is simply to "explain the
identity of the client," which is unnecessarily vague.202 If the attorney
tells the employee that he represents the corporation, she may think
he is stating the obvious and may have no idea the consequences this
has for the status of her confidences. 203
One other rule is on point. ABA Model Rule 4.3 deals with situa-
tions when an attorney interacts with an unrepresented person. 20 4 The
rule states that, when an attorney "knows or reasonably should know that
the unrepresented person misunderstands the lawyer's role in the mat-
ter, the lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to correct the misunder-
standing."205 Further, the rule cautions that the attorney should provide
no legal advice to the unrepresented individual except advice to obtain
counsel.206 Once again, this rule is of questionable help to a corporate
employee facing interrogation. Given that she is being questioned by an
attorney who is or who represents a superior, she may never express a
misunderstanding of his role. On the contrary, she may believe that she
fully understands his role: to get to the heart of the matter.207
Critics of privilege waiver claim that corporate officers and em-
ployees who provide statements during internal investigations, only to
see these statements used against them in a later criminal investigation,
are being deprived of their Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination. 208 At best, there is a sliver of truth to this proposition. As
a strict legal matter, it is incorrect because the Fifth Amendment pro-
201 Id.
202 Id.
203 See Duggin, supra note 8, at 938-39 (discussing inadequacy of Model Rule 1.13 in
employee interview setting).
24 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.3.
205 Id.
206 Id.
207 See Duggin, supra note 8, at 939-40 (discussing inadequacies of Model Rule 4.3 in
the context of employee interviews).
208 See Colin Marks, Corporate Investigations, Attorney-Client Privilege, and Selective Waiver: Is
a Half-Privilege Worth Having atAll? 30 SEArrLE U. L. Rsv. 155, 180-82 (2006).
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tects against governmental-not corporate--compulsion. 209 Neverthe-
less, one might have some sympathy for an employee who provides an
incriminating statement to corporate superiors ignorant of the conse-
quences and possible alternative courses of action. The remedy for this
problem, however, is not altering the power of DOJ to request privilege
waivers should a criminal investigation commence far in the future.
Rather, it is ensuring that the employee gets appropriate legal counsel-
ing from the outset.
This goal can best be accomplished by placing additional require-
ments on corporate counsel when they interface with employees. In-
stead of the weak and conditional warnings suggested by Upjohn and
the ABA Model Rules, counsel should be required to provide employ-
ees with an affirmative pre-interview warning that counsel does not
represent the employee, with the specific caution that anything the
employee says could be used against her in a later criminal prosecution
if the corporation should choose to cooperate and waive its privilege.
Counsel should further inform the employee that, if she has any ques-
tions regarding her own involvement in criminal activity, she would be
well-advised to contact a lawyer prior to answering any questions. Fi-
nally, counsel should provide the employee with the company's policy
regarding the possible consequences for failing to cooperate with an
internal investigation, so that she understands the full context of her
predicament. Ideally, the ethical rule should require this Miranda-type
cautioning to be in writing and the signature of the employee to ac-
knowledge receipt.2 10 If the employee expressed a desire to consult with
counsel prior to cooperating, her wishes would necessarily be accom-
modated.211
Some might argue that these suggestions would have a chilling
effect on internal investigations, thereby decreasing their utility and
ultimately causing more corporate fraud rather than less. This is not
the case, however. Undoubtedly, some employees would exercise their
option to consult with counsel, which could slow down the pace of an
internal investigation. But corporations would still possess consider-
able leverage to convince employees to be as cooperative as possible.
The bulk of that leverage, of course, would come from the threat of
209 Griffin, supra note 61, at 356-57(listing cases).
210 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444-45 (1966) (summarizing the warnings
that law enforcement must give to suspects in custody).
211 Cf Duggin, supra note 8, at 941-46; 958-62 (discussing various reformers proposals
to strengthen pre-interview warnings in the corporate employee setting; setting forth her
own proposals to amend the rules).
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the ultimate sanction: termination. Only an employee truly mired in
criminality would suffer this consequence rather than cooperate.
Thus, in most instances, the corporation should be able to discern the
extent of the criminal activity from innocent employees and those
whose conduct played only a minor role in it; the corporation can
then take any action the situation warrants.2 12
Furthermore, from the corporation's and society's perspective,
termination of rogue employees who refuse to cooperate is a net
good. It is a step toward the corporation purging itself of bad actors, it
marks the employee as a person of interest in any future criminal in-
vestigation, and it is a form of punishment for the rogue individual's
actions. As long as the employee made the decision to suffer these
consequences after exploration of all possible options with private
counsel, it is hard to see how this is a bad outcome.
C. Waiver Exposes the Corporation to Vulnerability in Other Litigation
Courts are divided on the issue of whether waiver of the attorney-
client privilege for one purpose constitutes waiver in all other circum-
stances. 213 This means that, if a corporation waives in the context of a
criminal investigation, it risks having a court determine later that it
has waived for purposes of unrelated litigation, such as shareholder
derivative suits and lawsuits by third parties claiming harm from the
corporation's misconduct. Critics of waiver point to this result as yet
another reason why it should be prohibited. 214
Views on whether waiver in a criminal case should automatically
result in waiver in other contexts vary depending on who is considering
the question. Corporations, of course, want to minimize the damages
they must pay out as a result of internal illegality, and having to reveal
privileged information to an opponent certainly does not further this
212 See Richter, supra note 41, at 33-34 (arguing that, even with warnings, internal in-
vestigations are likely to be successful).
213 See id. at 16 (observing that courts have almost unanimously rejected selective waiver);
see also Nolan Mitchell, Note, Preserving the Privilege: Codification of Selective Waiver and the Limits
of Federal Power over State Courts, 86 B.U. L. REv. 691, 692-93 (2006); Ashok M. Pinto, Note,
Cooperation and Self-Interest Are Strange Bedfellows: Limited Waiver of the Attorney-Client Priilege
Through Production of Privileged Documents in a Government Investigation, 106 W. VA. L. REv. 359,
368-82 (2004) (setting out the views of the various federal courts of appeals on the issue of
selective waiver). See generally Katherine M. Weiss, Note, Upjohn Co. v United States as Support
for Selective Waiver of the Attorney-Client Privilege in Corporate Criminal Investigations, 48 B.C. L.
REv. 501 (2007).
214 See, e.g., Carmen Couden, The Thompson Memorandum: A Revised Solution or Just a
Problem? 30J. CORP. L. 405, 418-19 (2007) (waiver might incite civil lawsuits).
[Vol. 49:1
The Battle over Waiver of the Attorney-Client Privilege
aim. On the other hand, the attorney-client privilege shields the truth
from the light of day; one could argue that, just as in the criminal
arena, privilege waiver leads to better, more efficient outcomes in col-
lateral private litigation as well.
In any event, weighing the pros and cons of extending waiver to
the civil context is beyond the scope of this Article. It is noted that
prosecutors are specifically counseled in the McNulty Memorandum to
consider whether waiver will result in collateral harm that outweighs its
benefits; accordingly, a corporation has the opportunity to convince
prosecutors that, in the specific circumstances it faces, waiver would be
harmful overall. 215 Further, the corporation can decide not to waive if it
believes that the potential collateral harm outweighs its benefits. Fi-
nally, proposals have been put on the table to amend attorney-client
privilege doctrine to permit selective waiver-that is, to allow corpora-
tions to waive privilege to assist in criminal cases without having to dis-
close the documents in any other context.216 This may very well strike
the correct balance between competing goals.2 17
D. Corporate Counsel Should Not Be Gatekeepers
A number of commentators have pointed out that the net result
of corporate cooperation and privilege waiver is the "deputation" of
corporate counsel in the fight against white collar crime.218 They con-
tend that this trend, also reflected in Sarbanes-Oxley's requirement
that corporate counsel report criminal activity up the corporate chain
215 McNulty Memorandum, supra note 36, at 9.
216 The Supreme Court's Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Evidence has
proposed a new Rule 502 that would foster selective waiver in the federal courts. See Ken-
neth S. Broun & Daniel J. Capra, Getting Control of Waiver of Privilege in the Federal Courts: A
Proposal for a Federal Rule of Evidence 502, 58 S.C. L. REv. 211, 238-40 (2006). Interestingly,
the ABA and affiliated groups at first strongly supported this provision, but apparently now
that they think they can successfully win their campaign to prohibit waiver altogether, they
have reversed their position, making enactment of the new rule unlikely. See Richter, supra
note 41, at 26.
217 See Richter, supra note 41, at 41-59 (discussing the contours of an appropriate selec-
tive waiver provision); Pinto, supra note 213, at 382-88 (arguing for the legislative orjudi-
cial creation of a selective waiver provision). But see Marks, supra note 208, at 190-94 (argu-
ing that selective waiver is an insufficient protection of the privilege).
218 See, e.g., Ellard, supra note 158, at 988 ("Today companies are under pressure to
waive that privilege, thereby, in effect, deputizing their counsel as federal agents"); Marks,
supra note 208, at 180 (discussing the deputation of corporate counsel); Zornow & Kra-
kaur, supra note 104, at 156-57 ("In all situations where the company decides to waive
privilege to please the prosecutor, the role of criminal counsel is repositioned from that of
the client's confidential legal advisor and the government's adversary into a conduit of
information between the client and the government.").
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of command and perhaps even to outsiders, 19 is bad for the nation's
commerce and the legal profession. These arguments are important,
and they merit examination.
There is no doubt that the net result of Sarbanes-Oxley, corpo-
rate cooperation, and attorney-client privilege waiver has been an in-
creasing level of enlistment of members of corporations' in-house
counsel departments and their outside law firms as soldiers in the bat-
tle against white collar crime. 220 It is exactly this additional manpower,
by insiders who hold sway over potential wrongdoers, that has en-
hanced the prosecution of white collar cases in recent years. The
question is whether this development is good or bad.
The fundamental argument against this trend is that it has
morphed the role of the corporate lawyer from trusted advisor to po-
tential government informant.221 Counsel will no longer be invited to
strategy sessions; her opinion will not be sought unless absolutely nec-
essary; her loyalty will constantly be questioned.2 22 An adversarial rela-
tionship between management and in-house counsel will erode cor-
porate compliance, resulting in more criminal behavior.22 3
Much of the response to this argument lies in the earlier discus-
sion of why corporate agents will seek legal advice despite lacking
iron-tight guarantees of confidentiality. 224 But the argument points
out a more human dimension to the problem. In effect, the prospects
of corporate cooperation and privilege waiver potentially pit em-
ployee against employee in the organization. It is likely to make fellow
employees more distrustful of each other, of management, and of
corporate counsel. The workplace will become a less pleasant envi-
ronment in which to function. 225
219 Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 307, 15 U.S.C.A. § 7245 (2002). For a discussion of this provi-
sion, see Thomas G. Bost, Corporate Lawyers After the Big Quake: The Conceptual Fault Line in
the Professional Duty of Confidentiality, 19 GEO.J. LEGAL ETics 1089, 1102-10 (2006).
220 Griffin, supra note 61, at 335-36.
221 See Zornow & Krakaur, supra note 104, at 157 (-The situation sometimes comes
close to converting corporate counsel into a government agent.").
222 See Griffin, supra note 61, at 335-36 ("Over time, corporations will respond by ex-
cluding lawyers from the very situations in which competent legal advice might best be
able to ensure compliance with the law.").
23 See Zornow & Krakaur, supra note 104, at 156-57 (arguing that waiver creates chill-
ing effect during internal investigations).
24 See supra notes 164-166 and accompanying text.
225 See Duggin, supra note 8, at 913-14 (arguing that privilege waiver creates atmos-
phere of disloyalty); Griffin, supra note 61, at 336 (noting that "corporate cooperation...
may cause disloyalty within the corporation" by creating conflict between individuals and
management).
[Vol. 49:1
The Battle over Waiver of the Attorney-Client Privilege
This is probably true, but it is not necessarily a bad thing. By many
accounts, the present corporate environment is one in which fraudu-
lent practices and other criminal activities abound.2 26 When an individ-
ual is caught committing a crime red-handed, his response often is that
"everyone else was doing it, too." A strong argument can be made that,
despite the personal hardships involved, shaking up the complacency
of the corporate environment is in the public's best interest.227
No players in the corporate game have resisted change more vig-
orously than members of the bar.228 This is not surprising given their
position and responsibilities. Lawyers are at the very heart of the corpo-
ration's compliance programs and investigative efforts. 2 29 Already they
must worry that they do not add anything of tangible value to the en-
terprise; instead, they present obstacles that must be overcome any time
the company wants to innovate. 230 At least their traditional role as cor-
porate litigators provides them with the opportunity to be white knights:
to protect and defend the corporation against harm from outsiders.
With this in mind, one can understand how awful those lawyers must
feel when, confronted with a government investigation, the product of
their own work is used as a primary weapon against the organization
and its employees if waiver is chosen.
In effect, lawyers do not want to be cast in the role of the con-
science of the enterprise. And for good reason: no one likes being a
killjoy.231 History demonstrates, however, that corporations are in des-
226 See COLEMAN, supra note 77, at 8-10.
227 As U.S. Attorney Mary Beth Buchanan writes:
Employees should not have false expectations concerning the confidentiality of
their communications with corporate counsel in an organization that has im-
plemented a compliance program that requires its employees to promptly pro-
vide complete information about wrongdoing. An effective program would also
require the organization to provide such information about criminal conduct to
the appropriate authorities and regulators. Such a zero tolerance approach to
employee crime is integral to the organizational culture of a good corporate
citizen and can be based on rewards as well as punitive action.
Buchanan, supra note 140, at 599.
228 See McClure, supra note 16.
229 See Sung Hui Kim, The Banality of Fraud: Re-Situating the Inside Counsel as Gatekeeper,
74 FORDHAM L. REV. 983, 997 (2005) ("[flnside counsel is the single most important law-
yer in a securities fraud committed by a public company and ... the logical lawyer candi-
date for the gatekeeping function.").
230 See id. at 1016-17 (discussing how in-house counsel are concerned about adding
value to their company).
231 Actually, the problem is probably worse than stated. A number of factors combine
to cause the atmosphere in many corporations to be one of indifference to legal compli-
ance. These factors include the personality of those who enter the business world and the
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perate need of consciences, and who better to serve in this capacity
than counsel? For one thing, counsel understands the legal landscape
and is in the best position to keep a corporation from straying from the
straight and narrow. In addition, attorneys are uniquely trained to serve
two masters at the same time: litigators, for example, are simultaneously
charged with representing their client zealously and serving as an offi-
cer of the court. Wearing dual hats is not easy, but it can be done.23 2
The bottom line is this: in the pre-waiver world, corporations had a
horrific track record of obeying the law. It is time for a new approach.
Expecting corporate counsel to be more aggressive in policing the ac-
tivities of the enterprise and using the results of counsel's efforts in
criminal (as well as civil enforcement) proceedings is well worth a try.
IV. PROTECTING AGAINST PROSECUTORIAL EXCESS
None of the foregoing should be taken to suggest that federal prose-
cutors are immune from abusing their authority Protections should be in
place to minimize the likelihood of such occurrences.
A. Ensuring That Waiver Is a Last Resort
Attorney-client privilege waiver should be a last resort, not a pre-
requisite to a corporation's cooperation. Because of the important
goals served by the privilege, a corporation should be permitted to
invoke it if at all possible. Thus, if other means of assisting prosecutors
are available to enable them to uncover the core criminality in a rea-
sonable amount of time, such assistance should warrant full credit.
culture of competition that they find when they get there. See COLEMAN, supra note 77, at
183-93. Legal counsel might initially approach the workplace with a more rule-abiding
orientation, but the forces of organizational conformity soon cause them to become
"amoral functionaries"just like those around them. See id. at 199-204.
232 Professor Kim argues that the banality of fraud in the corporate setting makes it dif-
ficult for in house counsel to play the role of gate keeper because of the pressures result-
ing from (1) being a "mere employee"; (2) wanting to be a "faithful agent"; and (3) want-
ing to be a team player. See Kim, supra note 229, at 1001-26. She argues that, as a result,
counsel develop a self-serving bias and motivated reasoning. See id. at 1027-29. To assist
counsel in playing the role of gatekeeper, she suggests three reforms: (1) public compa-
nies should transfer the oversight of their corporate legal departments from the company's
officers to a committee of independent board members; (2) the law should strengthen
whistleblower protection to attorneys under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act; and (3) public com-
panies should limit the amount of equity investments counsel can accept as compensation
to minimize conflicts of interest. See id. at 1053-74. These suggestions are worthy of careful
examination, which is left for another day.
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Only if all else has failed or is likely to fail should the subject of waiver
be broached. 233
The McNulty Memorandum comes close to stating that waiver is
to be treated as a last resort. It provides:
Waiver of attorney-client and work-product protections is
not a prerequisite to a finding that a company has cooperated
in the government's investigation....
Prosecutors may only request waiver ... when there is a le-
gitimate need for the privileged information to fulfill their law
enforcement obligations. A legitimate need for the informa-
tion is not established by concluding it is merely desirable or
convenient to obtain privileged information. 23 4
Further, the memo provides four criteria by which a prosecutor should
measure need: (1) the likelihood anddegree to which the information
will be helpful, (2) whether there are alternative means for obtaining
the information, (3) the completeness of voluntary disclosure already
provided, and (4) collateral consequences of waiver.2 35
The McNulty Memorandum could be improved by incorporating
an explicit statement that waiver should not be requested unless and
until all other means of obtaining the necessary information through
corporate cooperation have been pursued to no avail, or when it be-
comes clear that such means will not be sufficient to uncover the full
extent of complex criminality in a reasonable amount of time. This
would put more teeth in the Department's position that waiver will be
requested only in rare instances and might have the effect of calming
some critics. 23 6
If a prosecutor concludes that a waiver request is appropriate, the
request should be as minimally intrusive as possible. To this end, the
McNulty Memorandum divides protected material into two catego-
ries.23 7 The first ("Category I") contains purely factual information,
such as witness statements and underlying documents. 2 38 The second
233 See Duggin, supra note 8, at 962-63 (arguing that waiver requests should be made
only if there is "no other way to serve the interests ofjustice").
234 McNulty Memorandum, supra note 36, at 8-9.
235 Id. at 9.
236 For example, Senator Specter reacted to the "legitimate need" language of the
McNulty Memorandum by stating that such a standard "should guide the most basic of
prosecutorial requests, not sensitive requests for privileged information." Sen. Specter Con-
tinues Efforts, supra note 39, at 828.
237 McNulty Memorandum, supra note 36, at 9-10.
238 Id. at 9.
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category ("Category II") consists of attorney-client communications or
nonfactual attorney work-product, which might include attorney notes,
memoranda, and reports containing counsel's legal impressions and
advice.239 Category I information can be obtained only after approval of
the U.S. Attorney, who must consult with the Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral for the Criminal Division prior to giving approval.2 40 Prosecutors
are cautioned that Category 11 information should be sought only in
rare instances and only after obtaining approval from the Deputy At-
torney General.2 41 A corporation's determination not to provide Cate-
gory I information may be factored into the charging decision, but the
same judgment regarding Category II information may not.242
Although this regime has not satisfied critics of privilege waiver,243
it provides a genuine check on prosecutorial overreaching. No longer
can individual "line" prosecutors act as "cowboys" by demanding
waiver at the outset of an investigation. Personal approval by the U.S:
Attorney or the Deputy Attorney General is required in every case.
This also means that a corporation that believes it has been treated
unfairly with respect to attorney-client privilege issues can appeal any
disputed decisions up the chain of command. Because they are re-
moved from the front lines, supervisory Assistant U.S. Attorneys and
U.S. Attorneys themselves are more likely to give a fair hearing to
corporate counsel than their subordinates.
The McNulty Memorandum did not come into existence until De-
cember 2006.244 Time will tell if its provisions are sufficiently strenuous
to strike the right balance between adequate protection of attorney-
client confidences and successful prosecution of white collar crime.
DOJ has asked that the McNulty Memorandum be given a chance. 245 If
provided the opportunity, it appears that the McNulty Memorandum
may, with some caveats, provide a workable solution to the problem.
239 Id. at 10.
240 Id. at 9.
241 Id. at 10.
242 McNulty Memorandum, supra note 36, at 9-10.
243 See Wray & Hur, supra note 20, at 1179 (arguing that the prior approval provisions
of the McNulty Memorandum are too cumbersome and are not likely to be efficacious).
244 Weissman & Bugan, supra note 38, at 12.
245 See DOJ Official, Defense Attorneys Square Off over McNulty Memorandum Waiver Issue, 2
White Collar Crime Rep. (BNA) No. 1, at 25-26 (Feb. 2, 2007) (reporting on Assistant
Attorney General Alice S. Fisher's defense of the McNulty Memorandum during a panel
discussion with defense attorneys).
[Vol. 49:1
The Battle over Waiver of the Attorney-Client Privilege
B. Prohibiting Contemporaneous Teaming Up
Exhibit A for those making the case that DOJ has abused its au-
thority in recent years is its conduct in the on-going KPMG litigation. 246
In that case, prosecutors pressured the accounting firm KPMG to co-
operate early247 in its investigation into illegal tax shelters, which ulti-
mately led the firm to pay a $456 million fine.2 4a As it is a major ac-
counting firm engaged in public audits, KPMG's rush to cooperate
aggressively was highly rational; unlike most corporate defendants,
KPMG actually would have faced the same fate as Arthur Andersen had
it been indicted. As part of its cooperation, KPMG agreed not only to
make its employees available to prosecutors for questioning, but also to
sanction those employees who failed to cooperate with the govern-
ment.2 49 An employee's invocation of the Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination was considered lack of cooperation.2 50 Sanc-
tions included the denial of previously promised attorneys' fees and
termination of employment.2 51 Eventually, some of these employees
were indicted.2 52
In 2006, in United States v. Stein, the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York held, inter alia, that this arrangement
(and the Thompson Memorandum itself) violated the defendants'
Fifth Amendment right to due process and their Sixth Amendment
right to counsel of choice.2 53 Although the court focused on the at-
torneys' fees issue, it likely would have come to a similar conclusion
had it turned its attention to the admissibility of the statements that
several of the employees made after being threatened with dismissal.
At the time these statements were made, prosecutors and KPMG's
counsel had teamed up against the individual employees. 25 4 Under
the 1967 U.S. Supreme Court case Garrity v. New Jersey, there is no
question that the government could not have directly used threats of
employment termination to force KPMG employees to incriminate
246 See generally United States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330 (S.D.N.Y 2006).
247 See id. at 339-43 (describing early discussions between KPMG and U.S. Attorney's
Office).
248 Id. at 349.
249 See id. at 347-50.
250 See id.
25 Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 345-47.
252 Id. at 336, 350.
253 Id. at 362-73.
254 See id. at 363.
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themselves. 255 Though it is unclear under existing case law whether
the entanglement of the government and KPMG elevated the latter's
conduct to the level of state action, strong arguments can be made to
this effect.256 Regardless of legal doctrine, it seems clear as a norma-
tive matter that the government should not be able to enlist the aid of
an agent to do its bidding in this regard. Thus, convincing KMPG
management to sanction employees who invoked their Fifth Amend-
ment right amounted to prosecutorial overreaching.
Written after Judge Lewis Kaplan's decision in Stein, the McNulty
Memorandum specifically states that prosecutors "generally should
not take into account whether a corporation is advancing attorneys'
fees to employees or agents under investigation and indictment"
when evaluating the corporation's cooperation. 257 The only exception
to this is when the totality of circumstances indicates that the corpora-
tion's advancement of fees is part of an overall scheme to impede a
criminal investigation. 258 Once again, however, the Memorandum re-
quires approval by the Deputy Attorney General before a prosecutor
may consider this factor as part of the charging decision.2 59 As a re-
sult, the attorneys' fees issue appears to be off the table.
The McNulty Memorandum does not, however, explicitly address
the more general Garrity problem, a troubling oversight given that the
state of the law is unclear.2 60 Therefore, DOJ should issue an adden-
dum to the McNulty Memorandum providing explicit guidance ensur-
ing that the spirit of Garrity is enforced.2 61
25 See 385 U.S. 493, 496-98 (1967) (holding that evidence received from police offi-
cers who were compelled in an administrative inquiry either to answer questions or risk
losing their jobs violated their Fifth Amendment privilege).
256 Professor Griffin has done an excellent job of making this case. See Griffin, supra
note 61, at 365-71.
257 McNulty Memorandum, supra note 36, at 11.
258 Id. at 11 n.3.
259 Id.
260 See 385 U.S. at 496-98; see also Griffin, supra note 61, at 365-71.
261 This is not to say that government and corporate officials should not work together
contemporaneously to investigate and punish corporate crime if the allegations come to
light prior to the completion of an internal investigation. Indeed, a joint effort of this na-
ture appears to be functioning successfully in uncovering the latest corporate scourge, the
backdating of stock options. See Richter, supra note 41, at 39. It simply means that, when
the investigations are contemporaneous, special care must be taken to honor the rights
and privileges of corporate employees--even if this means that the investigation will take
more time.
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C. Prosecuting Corporate Agents and Employees for Lies Made to Superiors
The federal false statements statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1001, provides,
in part:
whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of the execu-
tive, legislative, or judicial branch of the Government of the
United States, knowingly and willfully ... makes any materi-
ally false, fictitious, or fraudulent statements or representa-
tions ... shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more
than 5 years... or both.262
In the 1984 case of United States v. Yermian, the U.S. Supreme Court
held that the government need not prove that the defendant knew he
was lying to the federal government in order to obtain a false state-
ments conviction.263 Later courts have gone even further, holding that
defendants are strictly liable on this element because it is jurisdic-
tional only.264
In a similar vein, one of the new Sarbanes-Oxley obstruction-of-
justice provisions states, in part, that "[w] hoever corruptly ... ob-
structs ... or impedes ... the due and proper administration of the
law under which any pending proceeding is being had before any de-
partment or agency of the United States" is guilty of a felony.265 This
statute does not require the obstruction to be direct, so long as the
intended impact is on the federal proceeding.266
The interpretation of these statutes has led to the prosecution of
some corporate employees for lying to in-house and outside counsel
during an internal investigation if a criminal investigation is also un-
derway.2 67 If the prosecution is for false statements, Yermian dictates that
the employee does not even need to be aware of the federal investiga-
tion.268 Although they have not gained much attention from critics of
privilege waiver, these prosecutions are very troubling.269 For the bal-
ance of power between the government, the corporation, and individ-
262 18 U.S.C.A. § 1001 (2006).
263 468 U.S. 63, 68-75 (1984).
264 See, e.g., United States v. Green, 745 F.2d 1205, 1210 (9th Cir. 1984); see also MODEL
PENAL CODE § 1.13(10)1 (Proposed Official Draft 1962) (defining jurisdictional elements
as nonmaterial, meaning that the defendant need not have mens rea regarding them).
2- 18 U.S.C.A. § 1505 (2004).
266 See id.
267 See Griffm, supra note 61, at 371-73.
268 See 468 U.S. at 68-75.
269 It has gained the attention of Professor Griffin, who agrees that it should be
stopped. See Griffin, supra note 61, at 373-74.
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ual employees to remain intact, the corporation's internal investigation
and the government's external one must remain independent of each
other. Otherwise, the two entities are in a position to "gang up" on the
employee, using tactics to compel cooperation that neither one could
use individually. A corporation has the power to fire an employee who
lies during its investigation; it should not also be able to make the
threat that any lies will subject the employee to criminal prosecution by
the government. The Department should renounce its intention to
prosecute such cases, seek legislation to reverse the Yermian, decision
and limit the scope of the obstruction statute.
CONCLUSION
Some might argue that the present debate over privilege waiver is
much ado about nothing. They might suggest that prohibiting DOJ
lawyers from requesting waiver and from using it to evaluate a corpora-
tion's cooperation would not fundamentally alter the status quo as long
as corporations retained the ability to waive voluntarily. The only thing
that would change is which party would initiate waiver discussions.
Such a contention, however, would be a misunderstanding of re-
ality. If a prohibition against asking for or using waiver were written
into law, the balance of power between prosecutors and corporations
would undergo a fundamental shift. Far more corporations would
choose to exercise their privilege even if it meant that they could pro-
vide only minimal assistance to a criminal investigation as a result. If a
prosecutor decided to bring charges against a corporation under such
circumstances, the corporation could move for dismissal of the in-
dictment based upon the statute, claiming that it was being penalized
for failing to waive privilege. This would be a powerful argument.270 If
the court refused to dismiss the charges, the same issue would arise at
sentencing. The corporation would want (and presumably would be
entitled to receive) the full benefit of cooperation, even if that coop-
eration were of little use.
Thus, it is not surprising that the issue of privilege waiver has
been so hotly debated. Indeed, it has induced near-hysteria in some
circles. 27' Cries that government practices have resulted in a "culture
270 See Statement of Barry M. Sabin, supra note 41.
271 For example, Susan Hackett begins her article with an outlandish hypothetical that
she claims is now quite possible in light of privilege waiver. See Hackett, supra note 158, at
132-34. Another example is the hyperbolic opening quote by N. Richard Janis in the
Christopher Wray and Robert Hur's article:
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of waiver" abound. 272 The ABA set up a task force that quickly con-
demned the practice of privilege waiver and started a very calculated
lobbying campaign to see it stopped. 273 Circling the wagons with other
lobbying groups, the bar association successfully pressed its case be-
fore the U.S. Sentencing Commission2 74 and achieved partial success
at DOJ.275 It continues to write letters to any government agency that
requests privilege waivers demanding that this practice be eliminated.
It is working behind the scenes to obtain passage of legislation that
would outlaw requests for waiver.276 The New York State Bar Associa-
tion has followed suit,27 7 and other state bars are not far behind.278
"[P]rosecutors have exploited their virtually unchecked power to extract and
coerce ever greater concessions, jeopardizing the very nature of our adversary
system. It is destruction by accretion-a staged but seemingly inexorable con-
centration of power that has skewed the system. The net result has been the
emasculation of the defense bar and the enforcement of the criminal law in a
way that is often wildly out of proportion to the perceived wrongdoing. It...
often is ... a state-sponsored shakedown scheme in which corporations are
extorted to pay penalties grossly out of proportion to any actual misconduct.
Criminal sanctions ... make the payment of tribute to the federal govern-
ment essentially a cost of doing business."
Wray & Hur, supra note 20, at 1095 (quoting N. Richard Janis, Deputizing Company Counsel
as Agents of the Federal Government: How Our Adversary System offustice is Being Destroyed, WASH.
LAw., Mar. 2005, available at http://www.dcbar.org/for-lawyers/resources/publications/
washington-lawyer/march_2005/stand.cfm).
Yet a third example comes from Colin Marks's article. See Marks, supra note 208, at
155. It begins by posing a hypothetical based upon the government asking an individual-
the reader-to waive privilege to obtain credit for cooperating. Id. He notes that the
reader would "likely be outraged" by this practice. See id. His hypothetical, however, is what
is truly outrageous; no one has ever suggested that privilege waiver has the slightest appli-
cation in the noncorporate setting.
272 See supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text.
273 See supra note 28.
274 On April 5, 2006, the U.S. Sentencing Commission recommended the deletion of
commentary in the Sentencing Guidelines suggesting that privilege waiver is a required
component of cooperation with the government in certain circumstances. The commen-
tary had been added in 2004. The deletion became effective on November 1, 2006, when
the time for congressional disapproval passed with no legislative action. See U.S. Sentencing
Commission Removes Guidelines' Reference to Waiver of Attorney-Client Privilege and Work-product
Protections, LrrsG. ALERT (Bingham McCutchen, Boston, Mass.), Mar. 2006, at 1-4, http://
www.bingham.com/Media.aspx?MediaID= 2716.
275 That success is found in the changes made by the McNulty Memorandum over
prior DOJ guidelines. Compare McNulty Memorandum, supra note 36, with Holder Memo-
randum, supra note 15, and Thompson Memorandum, supra note 19.
276 See supra note 34 and accompanying text (referencing the Specter Bill).
277 Sheri Qualters, State Bars Push Back on Privilege Waivers, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 13, 2006, at 9.
278 For example, the author is a member of the Florida Bar's Attorney-Client Task
Force created by the President of the Florida Bar in early 2007.
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Hysteria is probably an understandable reaction upon observing,
indeed, experiencing, a significant shift in the balance of power be-
tween the government and its people, even if those "people" are legal
fictions created to further economic progress. Nevertheless, it is not a
warranted reaction to the matter at hand.2 79 This Article has taken a
reasoned approach to addressing the question whether corporate
privilege waiver is a net good for society; it has engaged in a careful
cost-benefit analysis. Its conclusion is that retaining the ability of fed-
eral prosecutors to ask a corporation to waive its attorney-client privi-
lege, and to weigh the corporation's response when evaluating the
level of its cooperation, is in the public's best interest when waiver is
necessary to conduct a complex criminal investigation efficiently. A
few corrective brush sirokes, however, are necessary to paint a perfect
picture. First, corporate employees should be protected during inter-
nal corporate investigations by written warnings that include specific
references to the problem of self-incrimination and the right to sepa-
rate counsel. Second, the protections of the recently created McNulty
Memorandum should be strengthened by making it clear that waiver
requests are a last resort and by adding specific guidelines for situa-
tions where threats of termination force employees to incriminate
themselves. Third, the doctrine set out by the U.S. Supreme Court in
1984, in United States v. Yermian, allowing for strict liability in federal
prosecutions of employees for false statements made to counsel dur-
ing concurrent internal and criminal investigations, should be re-
nounced and reversed. With these adjustments in place, DOJ should
be left alone to continue its job of tracking down and aggressively
prosecuting white collar crime.
279 Professor Brown points out that the practicing bar had an equally hysterical reac-
tion to the proposed voluntary disclosure requirements under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure enacted in 1993, which turned out to be unwarranted. See Brown, supra note
131, at 943-44.
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